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The devastating earthquakes that ravaged Nepal in the spring of 2015 
demonstrated the risk of disaster that affects all of South Asia. They also demonstrated 
the real limits to a regional disaster management and response. According to The 
Kathmandu Post, almost 4175 troops from 18 countries were deployed for rescue and 
relief operations. All South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
member states except Afghanistan and Maldives rushed to help in the Nepalese tragedy. 
SAARC had no plan for this response mode of transporting relief materials. The lack of a 
pre-coordinated plan or resource management created tensions even in the capital 
Kathmandu. The situation in remote areas, where the road links were damaged and 
helicopters were the only mode of transporting relief materials, was even worse.  
The elements of a more effective structure for disaster response in the region may 
be at hand within SAARC. Political leaders all voice their support for regional effort to 
respond to or mitigate the frequent natural disasters in South Asia, but SAARC has not 
been able to establish strong institutions for coordinated response to higher magnitude 
disasters. 
This thesis examines why SAARC has not been able to form or sustain a strong 
disaster management organization and, based in part on other regions’ experiences with 
coordinated disaster management, which elements would contribute to a more effective 
regional disaster management within SAARC framework.   
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Eight variously poor and developing countries—Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, 
Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives—are located in South Asia. 
Although the region is blessed with enormous natural resources and geographical 
diversity, which has availed South Asia with immense potential for prosperity, South 
Asia experiences heavy floods almost every year. Landslides, avalanches, glacial lake 
outbursts, droughts, cyclones, tsunamis also are all frequently occurring. In addition to 
these various kinds of natural disasters, the region is prone to political instability and 
weak governance, which has created opportunities for man-made disasters.  
Migration across porous borders due to internal conflict or natural calamities has 
the potential to threaten the entire region’s security, making it essential for these 
interconnected countries to work together to alleviate the risk to regional order and 
stability.1 Hence, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has 
recognized the requirement to combine efforts with its active role to reduce the effects of 
disasters through awareness and preparedness for rescue and relief. To this end, SAARC 
has established a SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC) and various warning 
centers. 
SAARC has been suffering from indecision and problems in the implementation 
of programs, including disaster management measures. Since the formation of the SDMC 
in 2006, South Asia has posted few achievements in regional disaster management as 
compared with ASEAN. In 2014, SAARC leaders decided to merge the scattered regional 
centers working on disaster response under the single umbrella of SAARC Environment 
and Disaster Management Center (SEDMC); but no further decisions have been finalized 
as to where, how, and with which resources the SEDMC should operate. In this state of 
dilemma and deadlock, any attempts to highlight the previous weaknesses and viable 
suggestions to enhance the SEDMC are very significant.  
                                                 
1 Mahim Karim, “The Future of South Asian Security Prospects for a Nontraditional Regional Security 
Architecture,” The National Bureau of Asian Research NRB Project Report (April 2013): 04, 
http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/PSA/NTS_projectreport_April2013.pdf. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The devastating earthquakes that ravaged Nepal in the spring of 2015 
demonstrated the risk of disaster that affects all of South Asia. They also demonstrated 
the real limits to a regional disaster management and response. Almost 4175 troops from 
18 countries were deployed for rescue and relief operations.2 India was the first neighbor 
to join the Nepalese disaster response. All SAARC member states except Afghanistan 
and Maldives rushed to help in the Nepalese tragedy. The United States, United 
Kingdom, China, Japan, Germany, and South Korea were among the other nations 
supporting rescue, relief, and rehabilitation of victims. SAARC had no plan for this 
response once the support arrived in Kathmandu, however. The lack of a pre-coordinated 
plan or resource management created tensions even in the capital.3 The situation in the 
remote areas was even worse, where the road links were damaged and helicopters were 
the only mode of transporting relief materials.  
The elements of a more effective structure for disaster response in the region may 
be at hand within SAARC. SAARC charter identifies the first of the group’s objectives as 
the promotion “of the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of 
life.”4  Effective disaster relief and management clearly fall into this category of activity. 
SAARC has concentrated more on the development of the social and economic sectors, 
however. In addition, intrastate and interstate problems in the region have slowed 
progress further. Political leaders all voice their support for regional effort to respond to 
or mitigate the frequent natural disasters in South Asia, but SAARC has not been able to 
establish strong institutions for coordinated response to higher magnitude disasters. 
                                                 
2 “No More Foreign Troops, Says Nepal Army,” Kathmandu Post, May 12, 2015, 
http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/printedition/news/2015–05–11/no-more-foreign-troops-says-
na.html. 
3 “Nepal Earthquake: Tensions Rise Over Slow Pace of Aid,” The Guardian, Updated April 29, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/apr/29/nepal-earthquake-humanitarian-crisis-engulfing-8-
million-people-rolling-report. 
4 “South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC Charter,” Accessed Sept 05, 2015, 
http://saarc-sec.org/saarc-charter/5/. 
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This thesis examines why SAARC has not be able to form or sustain a strong 
disaster management organization and, based in part on other regions’ experiences with 
coordinated disaster management, which elements would contribute to a more effective 
regional disaster management within SAARC framework. How can a robust and capable 
disaster management organization, as part of SAARC, enhance regional security and 
cooperation? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Regionalism may be the dominant diplomatic trend in the early 21st century,5  
but it is a movement that has been long in the making. Regional cooperation as it is 
known today started after World War II in Western Europe with plans to achieve stability 
and prosperity after the destruction of war.6 In the case of Western Europe, the precursor 
organizations to the European Union served first to bind France and Germany together in 
cooperation rather than competition—a striking goal and a more striking achievement, 
granted how each state had declared the other its “hereditary enemy” and vowed to fight 
the other into submission in the preceding century and a half.7 
As the regional solution gained prominence, SAARC was established in 1985 to 
address the common aspirations for the social and economic well-being of South Asia.8 
SAARC secretariat is located in Kathmandu; other bodies are housed elsewhere in the 
region. Cooperation does not always come easily to the states of the South Asian region, 
but SAARC structure of committees and centers has established solid bases for—and 
records of—members working together. The SDMC, founded in 2006 and based on the 
campus of National Institute of Disaster Management in New Delhi, was one such 
                                                 
5 Kishore Mahbubani, “Multilateral Diplomacy,” Ch. 13 in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and 
Ramesh Thakur, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2013), 252. 
6 BjörnHettne and Fredrik Söderbaum. “Regional Cooperation: A Tool for Addressing Regional and 
Global Challenges.” In International Task Force on Global Public Goods, Meeting Global Challenges: 
International Cooperation in the National Interest, Final Report, Stockholm,2006, 182, 
http://www.cris.unu.edu/uploads/media/GlobalTaskForce.pdf. 
7 Dietrich Orlow, A History of Modern Germany: 1871 to Present, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008), 75. 
8 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC Charter. 
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cooperative entity.9 On paper, it has been superseded by the SEDMC, but no action has 
followed from the November 2014 SAARC summit in Kathmandu. 
Regional cooperation in connection with natural disaster response has an urgent 
logic in an area like South Asia that sees fairly regular calamities that transcend national 
boundaries—particularly during the flood season. The SDMC coordinated with national 
disaster centers for policy advice and capacity building, strategic learning, research, 
training, system development and exchange of information with the purpose to reduce the 
impact of disaster and disaster management.10 Important precedents informed the 
establishment of the SDMC. For one, SAARC embraced the 2005 Hyogo Framework for 
Action (HFA), touted as “a 10-year plan to make the world safer from natural hazards.”11 
Even before that, SAARC established an early warning system for tsunamis after the 
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, which may well be the deadliest “killer wave” in history.12 
Just before the tsunami, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
established the ASEAN Committee of Disaster Management (ACDM) in 2003. The 
ACDM formulated its Comprehensive Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response (AADMER) from 2005 and its Framework for Work Program for 
2010–2015. AADMER is the agreed framework, in line with the HFA, for all ASEAN 
nations for cooperation, coordination, and technical assistance for disaster management in 
the region; the work program sought to operationalize the vision set by ASEAN nations 
to make disaster-resilient and safe communities by 2015. 
The ACDM established the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian 
Assistance on disaster management(AHA center) in Jakarta in 2011 to coordinate 
emergency operations. AHA center coordinates with member states on management 
issues of standby arrangements and sharing early warning information. Most importantly, 
                                                 
9 “SAARC Disaster Management Centre,” Accessed Sept 05, 2015, http://saarc-
sdmc.nic.in/index.asp. 
10 Ibid. 
11 UNISDR, “Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA),”Accessed Sept 05, 2015, 
http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa. 
12  “The Deadliest Tsunami in History?” National Geographic News, January 7, 2005, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/12/1227_041226_tsunami.html. 
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it has facilitated a common vision among the member states of disaster management with 
strong political backing. In its turn, this shared institution has encouraged members to 
develop professionalism with various exercises in different countries, stockpile relief 
goods, and maintain consistent and adequate budget and staffing.13 
The SDMC followed in the footsteps of AHA center. The SDMC came up with 
many functional agreements. Notably it became the regional forum for weaker states to 
address their most urgent issues through the trans-boundary approach. It was the focal 
point for international donors to work on disaster-related issues in South Asia from a 
regional perspective.  
However, the political relations in SAARC are not as harmonious as those in 
ASEAN, which affects all aspects of the association. South Asia has seen four wars 
between regional giants, India and Pakistan. These animosities are often reflected in 
sundry border skirmishes as well as in obstacles at various state-level meetings of 
SAARC. In South Asia, India shares a common border with all countries except 
Afghanistan, and the economic dependencies of most countries lie with India. With such 
strategic and economic might, Indian hegemony in the region can—and often does—up-
end the notional equality among SAARC member states in practice. 
Initially, SAARC came up with SAARC Comprehensive Framework on Disaster 
Management in 2006, which paved the way to establish the office of SDMC in New 
Delhi. In line with AADMER, SAARC has also approved SAARC Agreement on Rapid 
Response to Natural Disaster (SARRND) in 2011.14  However, many member states have 
yet to ratify this agreement. Therefore, implementation on the operational side is weak, as 
the Nepal earthquake response demonstrated.  
                                                 
13 Daniel Petz, “Strengthening Regional and National Capacity for Disaster Risk Management: The 
case of ASEAN,” Brookings, Washington, DC, 2014, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/11/05-south-east-asia-drm-
petz/strengthening-regional-and-national-capacity-for-drm--case-of-asean-november-5–2014.pdf. 
14 Stacey White, “A Critical Disconnect: the Role of SAARC in Building the DRM Capacities of 




SAARC had no institutional presence in rescue and relief operation in Nepal 
2015; however, many states participated and, ultimately, cooperated, coordinated and 
developed something like regional assets. This progression showed that most of the 
member states have developed quick response capabilities utilizing their military assets. 
These teams were able to operate in different geographical and climatic conditions. 
However, no strong Nepalese national plan was in place to handle and coordinate all 
available national, regional and international resources. Most importantly, all the regional 
and international militaries had no problems working together when they were well 
coordinated and tasked. This aspect clearly highlighted the need for strong regional 
controlling and coordinating institutions with additional logistical, financial and technical 
capabilities. These capabilities seem to be achievable with the proper concern, decisions 
and commitments from the political masters of the region. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides a summary and a critique of the literature on 
regionalism, how regionalism is practiced in SAARC, disaster management centers in the 
region and the civil-military relations aspects in those disaster centers as well as in 
various disaster relief operations. The major issues in this literature review are the 
efficacy of regional cooperation and the establishment of the disaster management 
organization in South Asia. The literature review will point to some important gaps in 
studies about why SAARC and the SEDMC so far have not been effective. 
1. Regionalism and SAARC 
This part of literature review addresses how regionalism is perceived in the 
context of SAARC and whether regionalism matters in SAARC. The answer to these 
questions must underlie any strong disaster management setup in the region in the 
broader interest of SAARC.  
a. How Is Regionalism Perceived in the Context of SAARC? 
The basic concept of regionalism is the formation of an organization among states 
with a common interest to achieve a shared goal. In international politics, a region is 
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defined as “a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a 
degree of mutual independence and could be differentiated according to the level and 
scope of exchange, formal organizations, and political interdependence.”15 After a period 
of stagnation or underdevelopment during the Cold War, regionalism started to grow 
again in various corners of the world from the 1980s on. Regional organizations are now 
open and active rather than closed and quiet, reflecting even more interdependence of  
the global political economy and the stronger links between globalization and 
regionalization.16 These patterns of regional organization are now expanding all over the 
world.  
From the geographical perspective, for regionalism to flourish, the region should 
be distinguished as a relatively coherent territorial subsystem as compared with the global 
system.17 In other words, there must be something natural or inherent in a designated 
region; it cannot simply be fashioned out of any set of proximate states. Christopher 
Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein have pointed out collective identity as the binding 
factor for regionalism. For example, shared ethnic, historical, political, and cultural 
factors brought the United States closer to West European countries to form the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.18 Regionalism is now associated with policy and strategy, 
and is ultimately related to forming institutions in the regions.19 Without question, strong 
nationalism emerged in Europe after the 1990s with the formation of new states out of the 
former communist realm; however, the mutual interests of the nations push them toward 
                                                 
15 Muhammad J. Iqbal, “SAARC: Origin, Growth, Potential and Achievements.” Pakistan Journal of 
History and Culture 27, no. 2 (2006): 129, 
http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/SAARC_Jamshed_Iqbal.pdf. 
16 Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum. “Theorising the Rise of Regionness.” New Political 
Economy 5, no. 3 (2000): 457, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/713687778. 
17 Ibid., 461. 
18 Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There no NATO in Asia? Collective 




19 Hettne and Söderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness,” 457. 
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forming a stronger European Union as an institution to achieve shared goals, stability, 
and prosperity.  
The other concept is economic interdependence.20 Such an arrangement can be 
formal or informal. For example, among Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, Japan was the 
core for production of goods and Taiwan and South Korea were peripheral, 
supplementing Japan.21 However, this kind of coordination was of a temporary nature 
and changed with the development of economic capabilities of its members, notably the 
rise of the so-called Four Asian Tigers’ economies in their own right. 
b. Does Regionalism Matter in SAARC? 
From a neorealist perspective, policies adopted by weaker states are accepted until 
the hegemonic power feels threatened. The two Cold War superpowers were passive 
toward the activities of the regional organizations, but opposed them when regional 
activities clashed with superpower interests—as in U.S. opposition to sub-regional 
cooperation in Latin America and Soviet opposition to European regionalism.22 
There are also conditions of hegemony and cooperation in regional structures. 
India’s outsized position in SAARC, for example, has made South Asian regionalism 
move at a glacial speed.23 Initially, India was reluctant to form any regional organization 
in South Asia. Indeed, Indian scholars have very often characterized SAARC as a cabal 
of small, weak states ganging up to isolate India.24 Pakistani failure to find space in West 
Asia and Sri Lanka’s and Bangladesh’s failure to secure membership in ASEAN left 
them the only option of establishing a new regional organization in South Asia. These 
                                                 
20 Ananya Mukherjee Reed, “Regionalization in South Asia: Theory and Praxis, “Pacific 
Affairs (1997): 237, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2760774.pdf?acceptTC=true. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in world Politics,” Review of 
international Studies 21, no. 04 (1995): 341, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20097421.pdf. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Anirudha Gupta, “A Brahmanic Framework of Power in South Asia?” Economic and Political 
Weekly (1990): 714, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4396126.pdf?acceptTC=true. 
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states started lobbying their regional neighbors to form SAARC.25 When India finally 
sensed a threat to its interests from outside with the growing Pakistan-U.S. and Pakistan-
China relationships, India became at least lukewarm to the formation of SAARC.26 
The contemporary regional organization ASEAN has had better success than 
SAARC in solving intra-state conflict, resolving border disputes, and promoting better 
economic cooperation. ASEAN has come up with many bilateral border security 
arrangements to address the issues of cross-border insurgencies as well as formal and 
informal extradition.27 Meanwhile, in SAARC, the rivalries and trust deficit between 
India and Pakistan have made mutual security issues more prominent than other possible 
areas of agreement—for example, trade, commerce, and human security.  
The South Asian region is facing such challenges as poverty alleviation, 
minimizing the rate of unemployment, infrastructure development, and economic 
development. Over the last two decades, the sustained rate of economic growth has 
inspired India to seek a greater role in global politics. However, with weaker regional 
management, India’s neighbor Pakistan has been trying to balance India by engaging it 
more in regional politics, which furthers the “indirect regional containment” policy of 
global actors.28 In the meantime, China has penetrated widely in South Asia with its soft-
power strategy. This circumstance has forced India to better engage within its region. 
India is now pushed to engage with its neighbors either regionally or bilaterally. The 
engagement of regional actors with SAARC as a forum is now more important. 
The relevant literature agrees that regionalism within SAARC is currently weak. 
However, increased societal contacts and other transactions between the rival states will 
                                                 
25 Kripa Sridharan, Regional Organisations and Conflict Management: comparing ASEAN and 
SAARC, Crisis States Research Centre, 2008, 14, 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.460.4351&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
26 Sridharan, Regional Organisations and Conflict Management, 14. 
27 Rajshree Jetly, “Conflict Management Strategies in ASEAN: Perspectives for SAARC.” The 
Pacific Review 16, no. 1 (2003): 71, 
http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/0951274032000043244. 
28 Baldev Raj Nayar, and Thazha Varkey Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power 
Status, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003). 
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bring them closer. The region inherited a sense of affinities among its culture and people 
from the time of the British Raj. The wish and the declaration of the states of South Asia 
to work together in the field of disaster management, as well as many aspects of social 
and economic life, has made SAARC an important and unavoidable choice.  
2. Regional Disaster Management 
The regional approach to regional disaster management has increased the research 
on region-specific disasters and boosted the regional capacity to counter them.  
a. Regionalism in Disaster Management 
Once any country suffers disaster, the disaster management organ of the country, 
the local disaster management units, NGOS, and humanitarian agencies associated with 
disaster step in. In the case of a mega-scale disaster, which exceeds the capability of the 
affected country to manage, the international organizations and military components of 
disaster management from friendly countries have also started to act in the disaster zone 
for the rescue and relief of the victims.  
Various scholarly articles have noted the requirements and conditions of disaster 
management regionally. UN recognition of regional organizations in the maintenance of 
peace, security, and stability under UN Chapter VIII facilitated various regional 
organizations to conduct humanitarian actions and interventions at the time of crisis and 
disaster.29 Regionalism helps regions balance between the operational requirements of 
hierarchy and centralization and the strategic and practical benefits of decentralization. 
Caruson and MacManus see the model in line with the regional approach, distributing 
funds and facilities in metropolitan areas by decentralizing the resources to enhance 
emergency management/homeland security, even in the context of the United States as 
practiced in Florida.30 This decentralization concept does not fit properly with the 
                                                 
29 Lilianne Fan and Hanna B. Krebs, Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action: the case 
of ASEAN, HPG Working Paper, September 2014, 1, http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
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no. 3 (2008), 286, http://arp.sagepub.com/content/38/3/286.full.pdf. 
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existing regional disaster centers, but, from the U.S. and UN global perspective, it 
enables regional actors to react faster and allows global actors to engage later with better 
resources and information in the field.  
Severino notes that regionalism in ASEAN is not limited to economic integration 
only, but also incorporates environmental pollution and international terrorism.31 His 
focus is the facilitation of good governance by regional organization, which will pave the 
way to address other problems in the region.32 Goh further highlights the role of regional 
organizations like ASEAN as forums for smaller nations’ to engage with global powers 
such as the United States, China and Japan. Such forums accommodate global powers’ 
activities within regions while simultaneously protecting smaller nations’ security and 
economic interests, which these states may otherwise find difficult to protect with their 
individual capability.33 
McEntire identifies that most international organizations have the purpose to 
establish peace, development, trade, public health and environmental safety; disasters 
disturb and derail any progress in those fields.34 There are similar perceptions from most 
of the literature on international and regional organizations and their efforts toward 
peace, stability, and solving disaster-related problems. 
The Humanitarian Features Programme paper on “‘New Regionalism’: Cross-
Regional Collaboration and Humanitarian Futures” highlights that the risk sharing 
strategy is one of the important drivers of regional cooperation where humanitarian issues 
are increasing as a central issue for managing risk from disaster.35 While operating under 
                                                 
31 Nicholas Thomas, ed. Governance and Regionalism in Asia, Routledge, 2009, XVIII, 
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32 Ibid. 
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role,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (2011): lcr014, 23, 
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the umbrella of a regional organization, states must accept a certain level of risk to their 
sovereignty to develop their national capacity; thus, regionalism depends in this regard on 
how much of this risk the member states can tolerate.36 Such regional organizations as 
the EU and ASEAN have enjoyed significant success in helping their member states 
realize their core interests.  
In the case of SAARC, India pushes economic progress as the driving force for 
regionalism, whereas Pakistan focuses more on political issues to be solved earlier for 
better cooperation. Both approaches make the issue of disasters a lesser priority.37 
Today, there is limited turmoil in ASEAN; in contrast, India and Pakistan have fought 
four wars, and even peace between them is characterized by deep mistrust and hostility.38 
The mistrust between these two major players has prompted smaller states to bring out 
new issues of regional interest in discussion.39 Still, India is central in the 
implementation and success of any issues in the region. If India loses interest in an issue, 
it will die down slowly or measures will become ineffective. 
Disaster management has real potential to overcome interstate tensions for both 
the shorter and the longer terms. In spite of political and ideological differences between 
the United States and China, the armies of both countries are collaborating in the field of 
disaster management.40 Similarly, the military leaders in Myanmar were obligated to 
accept international aid when the country was badly hit by Cyclone Nargis in 2008, 
which later opened opportunities for interactions within ASEAN in the field of disaster 
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37 Sridharan, Regional Organisations and Conflict Management,14. 
38 Ibid. 
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management.41 This cooperation also opened interactions among leaders and bureaucrats 
at different levels, which ultimately developed the opportunity for first ever deployment 
of the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT), arranged by the ASEAN 
Secretariat in coordination with the ACDM and the government of Myanmar.42 
b. Basis for Regional Disaster Management Organizations 
Ferris highlights that regional organizations are more suitable for mobilization as 
they will share culture, customs, and problems. Therefore, many regional disaster 
management organizations have been developed in various regions. Ferris has suggested 
the importance of: 
 Analysis of the actual implementation of regional strategies and 
frameworks on the national level. 
 Examination, to the extent possible, of the impact of regional capacity-
building programs on national capacity. 
 Understanding the extent to which members of regional organizations 
provide political support to the regional body.43 
Ferris identified some challenges in various countries. Centrally adopted policies 
are not taken up properly at the local level, and the organizations and bodies to be 
developed are not in line with the suggested guidelines from regional organizations.44 
This work gives a broader picture of the active regional organizations, whereas the 
implementation role of the respective country is passive, which ultimately leads to weak 
management of disasters.  
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Kyoo-Man Ha researched four models of globalizing disaster management. He 
picked the UN model of professional coordination, in which the UN is a stakeholder 
along with civil society organizations, member states, and regional setups; the U.S. model 
of surveillance-oriented management, keeping the threat limited to avoid global 
consequences; the Korean model of copy-oriented effort to project national pride through 
service in disaster management; and the Indonesian model, a homogenization-based 
approach with a great deal of interest from the highest level of political leadership.45  He 
concludes that all models are capable only of handling localized disasters, and there 
would be problems amalgamating all the models in the case of a single mega-disaster.46 
Out of many regional disaster management organizations, some are effective, some have 
advanced partially, and some are still at the early stages of development. The situation 
created within the SEDMC with the lack of coordination and commitments further 
amplifies the relevancy of research question in the context of South Asia. 
Ferris and Petz have formulated a set of 17 indicators to measure the effectiveness 
of regional organizations on disaster management, including treaty frameworks and 
organization at various levels, financial setup, training, and mechanisms of cooperation 
and coordination such as military protocol.47 International organizations have helped a 
lot to shape better regional organizations. Ferris and Petz find that all regional 
originations share similar aspirations for regional cooperation but not necessarily for 
disaster management.48 While comparing disaster management centers of ASEAN and 
SAARC, some prominent entities in ASEAN are: the ASEAN Coordinating Center for 
Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Center), the ASEAN Defense 
Ministers’ Meeting Plus Experts’ Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster 
                                                 
45 Kyoo-Man Ha, “Four Models on Globalizing Disaster Management in the Asia-Pacific Region: 
a comparative perspective,” The Pacific Review 28, no. 2 (2015): 230–231, 
http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/09512748.2014.995123. 
46 Ibid. 
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Relief (ADMM+EWG HA/DR), and ASEAN Regional Forum’s Disaster Relief Exercise 
(ARFDiREx).49 ASEAN has a ministerial working group to develop formal protocols for 
military forces responding to disasters, which suggests bilateral, multilateral, or 
international military collaboration, training exercises, and assistance.50 
There are some similarities between SAARC and ASEAN on accepted strategic 
plans and programs for preparedness, emergency response, and technical cooperation; 
however, these “treaty-based approaches are more binding approaches to cooperation but 
the compliance provisions remain weak.”51 SDMC created a web-based South Asia 
Disaster Knowledge Network (SADKN) and a Digital Vulnerability Atlas (DVA) 
allowing access of information for each member state.52 This comparison reveals a major 
gap between the disaster management centers of SAARC and ASEAN in terms of 
infrastructure development, coordination, and military cooperation. The deep-seated 
political dispute within SAARC has hindered the progress of institutions like the 
SEDMC, whereas the endeavors in ASEAN have pushed the AHA Center quite a bit 
further ahead  
3. Civil-Military Relations in Disaster Management 
Most of the literature related to disaster management is focused on the increased 
role of civilian and humanitarian disaster response setups. However, disaster response is 
also an important aspect of national security, and no government can rule out the 
employment of armed forces, an important element of national power. Bruneau and Matei 
have also identified providing support to humanitarian assistance as one of the six roles 
of security forces, as most national armies have the tradition of engaging in humanitarian 
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assistance in various disaster relief operations.53 Even in the United States, the armed 
forces have a role in disaster management and response. In short-term rescue and 
response operations, the U.S. military may be tasked with: 
Search and rescue; emergency medical care; emergency transport of 
people; mass feeding; in-kind distribution of food, clothing, and other 
necessary commodities; epidemiological work and disease control; 
decontamination (in hazardous materials or radiological circumstances); 
temporary sheltering; firefighting; help in restoration of electric power and 
other utility services; debris removal to reopen roads; and bridge repair or 
temporary bridge replacement, as well as offer security and property 
protection aid.54 
Charles Kelley argues for the use of military resources only in the case of 
catastrophic circumstances when extraordinary resources are needed, lest the growth of 
civilian authority in disaster preparedness be lessened.55 In the case of international 
disaster relief operations, foreign armies normally show up after lives have been saved or 
lost, due to policies, procedures, and proximity. Therefore, Kelley suggests emphasizing 
specific capability gap areas only.56 Joëlle Jenny highlights that most aid organizations 
generally abide by institutional principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and 
independence; their aid workers try to avoid close association with an international force 
to protect their fundamental principles.57 Both authors stress capacity-building of 
humanitarian agencies for independent operations so that these organizations are not 
involved in any kind of prevailing or probable disputes in the field of operations. Hall and 
Cular write that there should be clear guidelines in the respective country’s disaster 
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management plan to avoid sensitive questions when the national army guides and 
operates together with foreign armies.58 These issues were more pressing in the case of 
politically sensitive areas with continuing insurgencies such as in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines. 
The UN Interagency Standing Committee and UN humanitarian agencies have 
agreed, in the Oslo Guidelines of January 1994, on the use of foreign military and civil 
defense assets in disaster relief under civilian control—with military components 
subordinate and coordinating through UN Civil-Military Coordination Center.59These 
guidelines also encourage UN member states to avoid more dependency on military 
resources. In view of the changed security environment in Afghanistan and Iraq after 
2003, UNOCH and its partners realized the increased complexity in humanitarian affairs 
and updated the Oslo Guidelines in 2006;the updated guidelines are known as Military 
and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) guidelines.60 Even though both documents identify 
humanitarian agencies as having the primary role, there are incidents of differences 
between military and humanitarian agencies in appreciating the security situation or 
following either the Oslo Guidelines or MCDA guidelines—as in the 2010 flood crisis in 
Pakistan.61 As of September 2014, UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination has 
conducted 236 emergency missions in 102 countries, mostly with civilian institutions and 
capacity.62 
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Malešič notes that assistance in disaster relief has become a diplomatic measure; 
the capability of an individual state/organization for disaster relief operations has become 
a tool of soft power.63 Chacho explains that “crisis management, humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), nonproliferation, and globally sanctioned operations” 
are major interest areas of all nations where the use of soft power is very critical to 
develop mutual relation at better condition.64 Solomon noted that soft power has 
advantages up to certain limits at which progress is paralyzed, unless hard power then 
pushes to achieve the interest.65 In spite of the limitations in the Oslo Guidelines on the 
use of military capability in disaster operations, capable countries are developing this 
ability so as to extend their influence whenever possible.    
Problems of coordination and communication persist. Because of the lack of civil-
military coordination between the U.S. military and its allies with the various 
international organizations in Zaire, Rwanda, and elsewhere in the region in 1994 after 
genocide and refugee flow , the mission failed to exploit the various capabilities of the 
NGOs deployed in the field and the military assistance was not effective with limited 
logistic supplies.66 Bennett et al. discuss findings from three separate country reports 
from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives during the disaster relief operation after the 
2004 tsunami, and identify that in the immediate response period, the role of national and 
international militaries was more crucial than other organizations and the procedures of 
the Oslo Guidelines were not practiced.67 There were questions on the distribution 
pattern, national approaches, activities, funding mechanisms, military-military 
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cooperation and civil-military cooperation, so the paper by Bennett et al. finally 
recommends civil–military coordination improvement through more extensive promotion 
of guidelines, principles, and procedures among all actors in the field of disaster 
management.68 
Militaries of different countries rapidly deployed sufficient, unique, expensive 
capabilities and assets in the rescue of April 2015 earthquake victims in Nepal.69 The 
experience marked a test of civil-military relations in Nepal. The Nepal Army was 
criticized as there was no clear sense of the comparative capabilities of the different 
forces and the civilian government entities and their international partners could not 
determine what the armed forces were doing in this realm, which led to confusion and 
missed opportunities for collaboration and exchange.70 As there were no clear guidelines 
on how to mobilize its resources and foreign armies, the army was strongly influential in 
promoting its interests and in asserting its views on how things should be run.71 This 
experience tracks with the analysis and experience of ASEAN. ASEAN Disaster 
Response, Training and Logistic Centre Enhancing Regional Governance in Disaster 
Management identifies the capacity lag within humanitarian agencies operating in 
disaster response in Southeast Asia and highlights the need for greater civil-military 
coordination under Disaster Response, Logistics, and Training Centre (DRTLC) to 
facilitate Training, Logistics and Financing aspects during peacetime and disaster relief 
operations.72 
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In sum, the reviewed literature clearly highlights the following conditions: (1) 
there is an increased trends toward the use of military and civil defense assets in the field 
of disaster management; (2) however, major literatures focus on the use of civilian 
resources as a better option and are critical about the use of military assets; (3) there is a 
gap in existing practices in civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) because humanitarian 
agencies are more focused on their principles whereas militaries are widening their role 
on the basis of MCDA Guidelines; (4) even though there is friction, both humanitarian 
agencies and militaries are bound to work together because of resource constraints within 
their institutional set ups; and (5) therefore, better CIMIC is needed in this situation, 
especially in developing counties and regions. The use of military and civil defense assets 
in disaster relief operations is derived from the UNOCHA Oslo Agreement, which 
requires civilian priority. However, resource constraints make developing countries too 
quick to use military and civil defense assets even where the civilian capacity exists. The 
procedures and practices have helped to create better coordination in the case of ASEAN; 
in the case of SAARC, the military protocol for the use of foreign military and resources 
is not endorsed regionally. The aspect of civil-military coordination in the field of 
disaster management within the regional organization is of high importance and has 
important implications for the research question, necessitating critical focus. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In this study, I present two hypothetical outcomes. The first hypothesis imagines 
that India and Pakistan set aside their political rivalries and unite to strengthen the 
SEDMC in the way that the ASEAN countries are developing their disaster center. The 
SEDMC should be able to manage India and Pakistan in such a way that the role of either 
country can be filled by capable SEDMC elements. The other members of SAARC must 
be very cautious and active to fill the gap for India while Pakistan is seeking assistance 
and vice-versa. However, working around this gap will not develop regional harmony. It 
will be very difficult to strike a balance for the weaker states while both countries vie for 
the lead in any political decisions.  
 21
The second hypothesis argues that the SEDMC should have at least two regional 
offices. The region should be divided into two sub-regions in which one or the other of 
South Asia’s two largest powers is dominant. This approach has already started in the 
economic sector as cooperation among Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal; these four 
countries have already held preliminary talks to remove hurdles to trade and spur 
economic growth.73 At least one regional disaster management center—likely the 
existing one focusing on India and the eastern members—and the other regional office 
might be developed to look after Pakistan, Afghanistan and the rest. These sub-regional 
centers should have the basic capability of rescue and relief for all kinds of disasters  
with additional specialization in certain region-specific disaster response capabilities  
such as responding to drought, tsunami, avalanches, deep water rescue or rescue from 
earthquake/landslide debris, which are necessary in the later phases of disaster 
management.  
The second hypothesis will probably be more workable but other member states 
should always strive to develop better political integration for durable peace in the region. 
Disaster management now has become a global interest and international organizations 
are now working with regional organizations. Individual countries cannot develop their 
national capability sufficiently and acceptably for the region. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis will be organized into five chapters. The first chapter, the introduction, 
states the question what are the basic terminologies, principles of disaster management 
and disaster patterns in South Asia. The second chapter discusses the regionalism in 
SAARC, and presents a comparison with ASEAN. Chapter III discusses the regional 
disaster management/disaster response structures, policies, and practices in ASEAN and 
SAARC. Chapter IV discusses the use of the armed forces in disaster management and 
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the significance of civil-military cooperation. Chapter V, the concluding chapter, includes 
the summary analysis, findings and recommendations on disaster management.  
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II. REGIONALISM 
Strong regional organizations form the basis for global organizations and vice-
versa. Regional organizations interconnect global organizations and individual states, as 
well as bringing together the states in a region. Where a given state might feel itself and 
its interests lost in the crowd of the major global organizations, a regional organization 
may offer more opportunities to speak up, to participate, or to pursue interests that loom 
largest. The goals of regional organizations mostly coincide with the goals of global 
organizations, perhaps with a particular regional inflection.  
However, some goals are regional by nature. For example, SAARC and ASEAN 
concern themselves with the issues that are most pressing in their respective regions. 
Most of the literature portrays ASEAN as an economic forum; however, when the 
organization was first stood up it was established to develop the security alliance among 
states in a region characterized by interstate tensions.74 The broad comity that 
characterizes ASEAN today—which both grows from and reaffirms the organization’s 
consensus-based internal culture, the storied “ASEAN way”—seems self-evident only 
after several decades of successful cooperation.75 The increasing economic cooperation 
within ASEAN, which was slated to culminate in economic integration in 2000, started 
quite a bit later—after the termination of the Cold War.76 
However, the economical, political, cultural, social, and geographical 
circumstances within SAARC are significantly different those in ASEAN. SAARC is 
much younger than ASEAN. The geographical and cultural proximity of the member 
states is closer in SAARC, but there remain huge differences between India and rest of 
the member states in terms of political structure and economic power. As a consequence, 
SAARC is India-centric. Additionally, SAARC’s second-leading power, Pakistan, 
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remains locked in a bitter military rivalry with India. As such, the institutions of SAARC 
remain underdeveloped, and the pace of the growth of SAARC is very slow. This 
situation has left SAARC incapable of addressing many burning issues such as trade, 
transit, disaster management, transfer of energy and issues on terrorism and security in 
the South Asian region. 
A. ASEAN 
ASEAN was established on August 8, 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the 
signing of “The ASEAN Declaration” by the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The aim was—and is—to establish 
“cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, technical, educational, and other fields, 
and the promotion of regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and 
the rule of law and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.”77 It was 
established amid real turmoil in the region and the world. Singapore had been established 
just two years earlier, and there were territorial disputes between Malaysia and Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines, and Singapore and Malaysia. There also was war in 
Vietnam. At the same time, the region had vast differences in economy, language, 
religion, and culture.  
However, by overcoming all those differences and bad relations, ASEAN moved 
forward in the direction of mutual benefit with common consent. ASEAN has now 
expanded to 10 members with the inclusion of Brunei Darussalam on 7 January 1984, 
Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 
April 1999.78 Additionally, there were some prominent regional factors that furthered 
strengthening of the regional cohesion in ASEAN, discussed below. 
                                                 




1. Keeping the Balance in the Role of Powers 
ASEAN has been able to promote and maintain balance among the powers in the 
region as well as the interests of external powers. During the Cold War, its members 
remained largely non-aligned in theory and in practice. After the Cold War, ASEAN 
facilitated the inclusion of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam as members. The United States, 
China, Russia, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Australia and other regional powers also 
found special space in various forum of ASEAN. This development helped to present 
ASEAN as neutral organization with a clear focus on achieving regional goals. 
2. Economic Prosperity 
As ASEAN has gotten going in earnest and especially after the Cold War, 
economic motivations have become the major driving factor for the new members to join 
the ASEAN initiatives.79 ASEAN has implemented various economic plans that have 
increased the region’s overall GDP from US$645 billion in 2002 to US$1504 billion in 
2008–2009.80 A growing consumer market and the expansion of production network is 
the new driving force that has broadened ASEAN.81 
3. Non-interference in Internal Affairs 
The founding members of ASEAN had deep concerns about interference in the 
internal issues of the member states from regional members or  states outside the region. 
The leaders during the group’s formation wanted the member states to recognize their 
common responsibility to shape their own destiny, avoiding external intervention and 
solving their own problems.82 They were very aware of the danger of Balkanization in 
Southeast Asia if they started to interfere in one another’s internal issues.83 
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4. Culture of Consultation and Consent 
Over time, ASEAN has developed various forums for the formal and informal 
interactions of the representatives of the member states so as to keep everybody in the 
picture of the region and to develop better rapport among each other. There are still many 
territorial disputes among many ASEAN nations; however, they are committed to solve 
these by peaceful means of dialogue through consultation and consent.84 They 
normalized diplomatic relations among Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines 
by keeping aside their territorial disputes to move ahead with the ASEAN. 
To achieve its aim and purpose, ASEAN Member States adopted the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 1976 with the following fundamental 
principles: 
1. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity, and national identity of all nations; 
2. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion; 
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
4. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; 
5. Renunciation of the threat or use of force 
6. Effective cooperation among themselves.85 
Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in1994 was a good step to 
create a better environment to intensify diplomatic interactions to address regional 
problems. Additionally, the heads of states in ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) in 
2003 identified three sectors of community as pillars of cooperation to achieve ASEAN’s 
vision for 2020: ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).86 
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APSC focuses on the issues related to political development by sharing and 
shaping norms for prevention, resolution of conflict and post-conflict peace building 
mechanisms.87 AEC opened dialogue in formulating free trade of goods, services, capital 
and economic development in the region. In the initial stage of ASEAN, leaders focused 
on establishing pocket-based industries requiring large investment in individual countries. 
These efforts were intended to address the demands of the whole region by improving 
economic sustainability. ASEAN governments agreed to establish fertilizer plants in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, as well as a diesel plant in Singapore in 1976.88 
ASCC faced even greater challenges with the task of uniting Vietnam to 
Myanmar and Cambodia to Indonesia. ASEAN also has had the challenge to uplift the 
socio-economic condition of new members Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. These new 
members have benefited by the ASEAN Free Trade Agreements (AFTA). They have also 
found a position from which they can project themselves internationally.   
Major setbacks for ASEAN are its continuing inability to control human 
trafficking, drug trafficking, and human right violations in the region; the uneven pace of 
democratization also has presented real challenges. There is no hegemon in the region, 
which allows the several member states to make decisions about their own interests. 
However, it often takes quite a long time to develop consent when merging issues among 
the member states. The charter of ASEAN does not forbid any voting process, and yet 
ASEAN has not adopted any formal voting mechanism for major decision-making 
processes, a weakness that might create a situation when the global or regional hegemon 
could force ASEAN states to follow a decision imposed on them.89 There are more 
authoritarian regimes among ASEAN member states; democratic norms, values and 
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transnational issues (environment, refugees, migration and human rights) are less 
discussed in ASEAN forums.90 Democratization within the region and regional forums 
will help to strengthen ASEAN in identifying and solving overlooked regional issues in 
more efficient way. 
B. SAARC 
The leaders of the seven South Asian countries—Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan—established SAARC in 1985 as a regional 
political and economic organization of the South Asia with the aspiration of regional 
peace, economic prosperity, and social empowerment for the people in the region. The 
fourteenth SAARC Summit in Dhaka in November 2005 approved the inclusion of 
Afghanistan as its eighth member.91 All member states except Afghanistan share a 
common border with India. The countries of the region were economically, culturally, 
and sociologically linked because of the British rule of the region for almost 200 years. 
The rationale of forming SAARC was to create a regional community for common 
interest, value, actions and inter-governmental cooperation.92 
Many of the same factors that commended the creation of a regional organization 
in South Asia also conspire to keep the states of the region at odds. Geographically, 
transiting through India is the most convenient mode of communication in the region, and 
Pakistan is the avenue to connect South Asia to Central Asia. The strategic locations of 
these two countries and their well-entrenched “sibling rivalry” limits development in and 
around the region. The landlocked countries of Nepal and Bhutan have no option other 
than transiting through India to connect with other countries of the region and the rest of 
the world. Such dependencies make India an even stronger player in SAARC forums; 
India often raises problems related most to its own interests, which prompts other states 
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to comply or cooperate on paper only. When there are follow-up meetings, oftentimes the 
previous agreements are not ratified. Issues like the SAARC Convention on Combating 
Terrorism in 1987 and the SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters in 
2011 are not ratified from its full members. Similarly, the agreements on SAARC Free 
Trade Areas(SAFTA) aims to reduce the custom duties to zero within the region by 2016; 
however the failure thus far of India and Pakistan to ratify the measure has halted the full 
implementation of the SAFTA.93 Bhutan also has not ratified International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,94  which has hindered SAARC in addressing these issues in the region for greater 
political, social, economic and cultural integration. 
1. Endeavors by SAARC 
In spite of weak regionalism and slow progress, SAARC has been able to bring 
consensus among the member states on such serious, if less contentious, issues as poverty 
alleviation, trade and transit, energy security, food security, science and technology, and 
disaster management.  
a. Poverty Alleviation 
Poverty is the main problem of the region with 31.7 percent of South Asia 
(around 433 million) living in abject poverty.95 The very first SAARC Declaration in 
Bangladesh in 1985 highlighted the challenges posed by poverty accompanied by 
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underdevelopment, a low level of production, and unemployment.96 However, it took 
time for SAARC member states to identify programs to address the issues. Lack of 
capacity to solve the issue alone made them to decide to work together with the other 
organizations working in the region in poverty alleviation. Additionally, in 2006, the 
Dhaka Summit set SAARC Development Goals with poverty alleviation as an important 
target in the region. At the Islamabad summit in 2004, leaders decided to establish 
Poverty Alleviation Funds with the contributions of its member states. The major reasons 
for the inability to effectively implement programs were a resource crunch, a lack  
of inter-sectoral coordination, and ineffective performance on adopted activities.97  
SAARC has not been able to solve these issues properly; however, awareness and 
identification of areas on which to focus have helped to align national and regional 
resources in alleviating poverty.  
b. Trade and Transit 
SAARC identified the importance of economic activities in the region and tried to 
facilitate economic activities with the agreements on South Asian Preferential Trade 
Areas (SAPTA) and later the agreement on South Asian Free Trade Areas. SAPTA was 
an initial endeavor to enlarge trade among members on preferential goods by facilitating 
and lifting trade barriers. The process of implementing SAPTA experienced many tariff 
and non-tariff barriers. High tariff imposition on imports is the major step taken by 
weaker members to insulate their industries from competition with the export-oriented 
state of India. Therefore, SAFTA has categorized the members as middle-income 
countries (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and least developed countries (Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal) providing a longer time frame for the least-developed 
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countries to abolish their trade barriers.98 Low economic growth of SAARC countries 
other than India leaves them desirous of better economic development with their existing 
immense natural and human resources. Slow economic growth has also created many 
hubs in the region where population is concentrated. However, the lack of connections 
and communication among these hubs has restricted further growth. The continuing 
security problem between India-Pakistan and border crossing hassles in Nepal-India-
Bangladesh is retarding the pace of trade.  
c. Energy Security 
Energy security means the availability of energy at all times at a sufficient rate 
and affordable cost.99 The supply of energy should therefore meet the requirements of the 
market at all time with a source/reserve through secured supply chain. South Asia 
depends on coal (47 percent), petroleum (33 percent), natural gas (12 percent), 
hydropower (7 percent) and nuclear power (1 percent).100The region has considerable 
deposits of coal and natural gas; however, the region must import petro-chemicals from 
outside the region.The region has high potential for hydro-power and programs are in the 
works for nuclear power generation. However, the region has to focus more on renewable 
sources of energy from hydro-power, solar, wind and bio-gas. Establishment and 
management of the power grid is another problem in the region. Bilateral generation and 
transmissions of electricity exists between Nepal-India, India-Bangladesh and India-
Bhutan.101 
In the Kathmandu SAARC Declaration in 2014, with a high priority placed on 
meeting the growing demand of electricity in the region, leaders decided to identify 
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regional and sub-regional areas of power generation, transmission and power trade 
including hydropower, natural gas, solar, wind and bio-fuel.102 Subsequently, a related 
commission has been formed to set priorities for the feasibility and procedures to fulfill 
the increasing need of the region. There are possibilities of more power purchase 
agreements; however chances of any immediate huge agreement are very slim due to 
insufficiency of power in all countries and trust deficit among the member states. 
d. Food Security 
According to the World Bank, the 1.5 billion people of South Asia will rise to 2.2 
billion in 2050, causing a major shortfall in the food supply.103 Scarcity of food would 
create instability very quickly, as the region already knows from times of disaster, flood, 
and famine. The governments in the region have taken this issue very seriously since the 
establishment of SAARC. SAARC has established SAARC Food Banks in every member 
state since 2007.104 In each, there is an organizational hub in the center and with spokes 
of national focal points to coordinate and manage stock and supply of food in the region. 
Still, at the summit in Kathmandu in 2014, the leaders remained concerned about food 
security and the enhancement of agricultural production.  
e. Science and Technology 
Science and technological input to any field will enhance the capability of 
SAARC. Technological development is the aspiration of the world and the South Asia 
region also aspires to achieve this. It is difficult for small countries to invest large 
amounts of money in research and development. The joint research center, with wide 
areas promoted by SAARC, is a beneficial project for all. The first ministerial meeting on 
science and technology in 2005  
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agreed to make important strides in the areas of science, technology and 
higher education, to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century and 
decided to give priority attention to encourage regional cooperation in 
these areas to derive benefits from the synergy of collective, well-planned 
and focused initiatives undertaken by Member States.105 
However, very little has been achieved in the field except an early warning system for 
disaster management. 
f. Disaster Management 
Disaster, the most difficult concern of the region, has worried SAARC forum 
since its establishment. But it took almost twenty years for SAARC to establish an 
official regional disaster center. Growing concern over climate change further highlighted 
SAARC region as one ecological belt sharing the same types of river systems, monsoons, 
climatic conditions and coastal regions. The effects of disasters were also the same in 
nature throughout the region. SAARC established the SAARC Centre for Disaster 
Management and Preparedness (SDMC) in New Delhi, the SAARC Coastal Zone 
Management Centre (SCZMC) in Male and the SAARC Meteorological Centre (SMRC) 
in Dhaka. The formation of new organizations increased the numbers of 
intergovernmental coordination meetings. The agreement on rapid response was passed 
in 2011; however, the leaders failed to set up a dedicated SAARC disaster management 
rapid action force (SDMRAF) at the 2014 SAARC Summit in Kathmandu.106 
Without a coordinated operating force to be deployed on the ground, SDMC 
became the regional focal point based in Delhi coordinating only with national focal 
points. The SDMC was a good initiative in the region to address the critical issue of 
disaster management. From its establishment, the SDMC developed various Road Maps 
on different aspects of disaster management by involving various experts and 
representatives from member states and such NGOs working in this field as: Community 
Based Disaster Risk Management in South Asia, Application of Science and Technology 
for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management, Coastal and Marine Risk Mitigation Plan, 
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Integration of Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation in South Asia, 
Mainstreaming Disaster Reduction in Development in South Asia, Earthquake Risk 
Management in South Asia, Landslide Risk Management in South Asia, Urban Risk 
Management in South Asia, Drought Risk Management in South Asia, Flood Risk 
Management in South Asia.107 Even though the SDMC did not excel as anticipated, it 
moved far ahead to shape the formation of a better regional disaster management 
apparatus. Many weaker aspects can be improved, which will ultimately promote the 
transformation of an effective disaster management center in the region. Members of 
SAARC should start working heartily on socio-economic and humanitarian issues; 
increased interactions will ultimately help identify and develop various fields of 
cooperation. 
C. SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION WITHIN SAARC 
In South Asia, there are some geographical similarities in seismology, river 
systems, Himalayan ranges and political proximity, which make some countries more 
similar to each other. The East Indian provinces, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh share 
these similarities. As the progress in SAARC is moving at a very slow pace, these 
countries are trying to make progress in the sub-regional level. Bangladesh has mutual 
interests with Bhutan and Nepal on the issue of natural disasters as it shares some major 
river system with them. India, on the other hand, is cooperating bilaterally with those 
countries, excluding Bangladesh, on the use of those river systems. Land-locked 
countries Nepal and Bhutan are desperately trying to develop access to the sea through 
Bangladesh to minimize overdependence on India.  
Four countries—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN)—signed the Motor 
Vehicle Agreement (BBIN-MVA) for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo 
Vehicular Traffic on June 15, 2015.108 India has already developed its bilateral ties with 
these three countries on rail, road, power and transit. ADB has pushed to develop the 
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South Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) program in 1996 and was 
further endorsed from the1997 SAARC Summit in Malé.109 Sri Lanka and Maldives also 
moved forward to join this cooperation, which could at least convince donors to invest in 
the region. SASEC has invested US$63.74 million in the sub-region in transport, trade 
facilitation, energy, and ICT.110 
Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh want to develop their connectivity through the 
implementation of BBIN-MVA. This implementation will create more areas for 
investment in connectivity and furthers cooperation on other needy areas. Once economic 
and political issues are settled and the agreements start to function, there will be the 
possibility to develop other capabilities in high priority areas like flood control, 
landslides and other environmental hazards.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Regionalism in the present world has become the forum for the expression of 
common sense and collective efforts for nations to fulfill their desires. In the process of 
regional integration and cooperation, the burning aspirations of regions become vital, and 
organizations have to be serious for such goals to be achieved. The success of 
regionalism means the achievement of common goals. An individual country’s decision 
to join the club of regional neighbors at times might prejudice the individual interests and 
sovereignty of the nation-state. Regular interactions and an environment that fosters trust  
are required among the participating states to dilute their suspicion against their 
neighbors. 
As compared to the states in Europe, the countries in the South and Southeast 
Asia are newly born; and they are more sensitive about issues of sovereignty.111 ASEAN 
has been able to develop regional cooperation while keeping their sovereignty a priority 
through applying the principle of non-interference in domestic issues and regular meeting 
                                                 
109 Chaudhury, Ray, Basu, and Bhonsale, “ORF Occasional Paper# 69,” (2015), 06. 
110 2001–2015 SASEC Project Portfolio Summary, SASEC, Accessed Feb 01, 2016, 
http://sasec.asia/index.php?page=projects. 
111 Acharya, “Democratisation and the Prospects for Participatory Regionalism,” 379. 
 36 
among state leadership; whereas in SAARC, rivalry between states has often made them 
suspicious of one another.  
Economic cooperation in the South Asian region is also very slow. The main 
reason for suspicion on the part of smaller nations is their perception of India as 
economic leviathan that might dominate their internal markets with a glut of cheap Indian 
products.112 India, meanwhile, is separately developing bilateral economic relations with 
all its neighbors. There is diverging negotiating perception between India and others 
where India focuses on regional economic integration but smaller countries are more 
worried about their economic self-sufficiency.113 ASEAN has the same kinds of ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreements (AFTA) as SAFTA in SAARC. But ASEAN has developed the 
ARF to discuss contending political and economic issues. India and Pakistan from 
SAARC are also members of the ARF.  
To address political issues through the regional framework, the conflicting parties 
must negotiate with their national interest for broader achievement. There are numerous 
political problems within SAARC and ASEAN. ASEAN solved some political issues 
immediately after its formation and those that are larger or thornier are kept aside while 
the states have moved ahead with economic cooperation. Political progress serves as the 
basis of all other cooperation by creating pressure on other burning issues for facilitation 
and integration.114 Smaller states in SAARC wanted their grievances to be solved 
through this forum. Most of the member states have some political problems with India: 
India and Pakistan have Kashmir and their water-sharing issue; India and Nepal have 
water-sharing and transit issues; India and Bangladesh have water-sharing issues.  
India does not show any positive will to solve these issues, which has left the 
other states to act against India. From the Indian perspective, the smaller states are unable 
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to come up with “coherent and sustained constructive approach” and often prefer a 
“strategy of pinpricks, irritations, harassments, denial of mutual benefits, sabotage and 
even confrontation (as in case of Pakistan)” while dealing with India.115 
From the Pakistani perspective, due to the “historical animosity, hawkish mindset 
and non-conciliatory approach of India,” many pressing issues like terrorism and water 
sharing are unresolved, paralyzing regional coordination.116 Even if decisions are made, 
the states may not wholeheartedly follow those decisions and may try to address the issue 
with different approach. Such incidents are weakening the coordination and regionalism 
within SAARC. 
As compared with the contemporary ASEAN, the problem of regional integration 
and regional coordination has made SAARC weaker than other such organizations. 
Regional integration and coordination is positively correlated with equal level of 
industrialization and economic diversification.117 Most South Asian elites view their 
neighbors warily. Other states consider India to be a strong economy and military but 
also fear its military aggression; Pakistan, meanwhile, is viewed as authoritarian, 
politically unstable, and oriented outside SAARC.118 Meanwhile, the other smaller 
countries are not interacting well with each other because of India’s proximity and 
because they are not in a position to make much difference in isolation.119The vast 
difference in the level of industrialization and economic capability, further coupled with 
political distrust among the nations, has made SAARC a weak regional organization.  
 
                                                 
115 S. D. Muni, “Problem Areas in India’s Neighborhood Policy,” South Asian Survey 10, no. 2 
(2003): 186, http://sas.sagepub.com/content/10/2/185.full.pdf. 
116 Rahila Asfa and Mughees Ahmed, “Prospects of Regionalism: Comparative Analysis of SAARC 
and ASEAN,” Asia Pacific-Annual Research Journal of Far East & South East Asia 33 (2015), 
http://sujo.usindh.edu.pk/index.php/ASIA-PACIFIC/article/view/914/857. 
117 Ernst B. Haas, “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process,” International 
Organization 15, no. 03 (1961), http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2705338.pdf?acceptTC=true. 
118 Keeping in view with economic reliance of Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka over India 
and the border problems of these countries and Pakistan with India. In the mean time, India is continuously 
blaming Pakistan for not being able to control non-state armed elements causing trouble in India.    
119 Kishore C. Dash, Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures, 
Vol. 8, Routledge (2008), 183. 
 38
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 39
III. THE REGIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT/DISASTER 
RESPONSE STRUCTURES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES IN 
ASEAN AND SAARC 
When natural disasters strike, affected countries activate their respective national 
disaster management organizations (NDMO). SAARC was comparatively late to realize a 
regional approach to disaster management and disaster response. Still, the growing 
success of regional organizations like ASEAN has pushed SAARC to move ahead on 
forming consensus on the various aspects to structure a robust disaster management 
center. Other regional organizations like ASEAN have been able to identify and enjoy the 
combined effects of globalization, market facilitation, and freedom of movement, culture, 
and religion amid a framework of regional cooperation; meanwhile, states in South Asia 
are very sensitive to traditional issues like sovereignty, domestic market protection, and 
their hard-won cultures of self-reliance. Moreover, the nations of South Asia have 
focused more on using their military and civil defense assets in their disaster management 
strategies. This preference makes the states of the region even less inclined to operate 
together with neighboring states’ militaries in times of crisis.  
There are differences in organization, working procedures, resource mobilization, 
coordination systems, and the primary focus of regional disaster management centers in 
ASEAN and SAARC. However, geographical proximity, the interlinked effects of natural 
disasters, similar historical legacies, similarity in economic capabilities, and regional 
interactions mean these regions are inextricably connected. ASEAN started to develop its 
regional approach earlier, and SAARC is trying to follow ASEAN’s footstep in many 
sectors; this purposeful modeling makes comparison between these two organizations 
vital on identifying reasons of success and causes of failure in different sectors.  
A. COMPARISON BETWEEN ASEAN AND SAARC DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT CENTERS 
The recognition of the necessity of a strong disaster management commitment in 
the region started after the region was hit by an earthquake and tsunami in 2004. This 
disaster affected ASEAN directly. The same event also alarmed SAARC because of the 
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immense losses in the coastal regions of India and Sri Lanka, particularly because of the 
tidal wave that the quake loosed on the region. As a consequence, both ASEAN and 
SAARC developed new policy, guidelines, and structures for disaster management and 
disaster response; however, the homogeneity within the institution took ASEAN to a 
higher level of functionality and, arguably, effectiveness than SAARC.  
1. Policy Adoption 
Before the regional endeavor to disaster response was developed, there were 
national policies and guidelines in the region to deal with disasters. Realizing that 
disasters hampered the region’s aspirations for prosperity and development, leaders 
initiated discussion of the issue from the initial years of ASEAN and SAARC. Disasters 
do not recognize borders and their causes and effects are transnational; this further 
pushed leaders to form policies to deal with these phenomena. More significantly, 
unbearable casualties from the earthquake and Indian Tsunami of 2004 left no choice for 
the leaders of both SAARC and ASEAN to adopt all policies and plans to deal with any 
upcoming disaster in the region.  
a. ASEAN 
The policy guidelines on disaster management in ASEAN date back from 
ASEAN Declaration for Mutual Assistance for Natural Disasters in 1976. Furthermore, 
APSC and ASSC also formulated policies on various aspects related to disaster 
management. APSC focused politically on developing policies on political guidelines to 
establish the structure of the AHA center and its bodies, civil-military coordination, and 
standby agreements, and coordinated a working interface among all bodies in ASEAN 
structure.120 The ASCC contributed socio-economically to establish various structures in 
ASEAN, formulate SOPs to conduct a wide range of operations, educate and establish 
knowledge networks, monitor activities of organizations within ASEAN and member 
states, thereby developing the overall capacity within ASEAN and member states. These 
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policies were further strengthened by AADMER, various declarations and agreements 
after periodic ministerial meetings and ASEAN summits. Various programs furthered 
AADMER policies on operations, maintained structures and attained targets with various 
activities. The AHA center identified various critical capabilities to develop manpower, 
resources, and logistics. It has conducted various trainings concerning manpower 
development, rapid response team and logistic capability, coordinated NDMOs for their 
capability development, and maintained the capability required according to the standby 
agreement. 
b. SAARC 
The greater hope for the regional approach to disaster management in SAARC is 
the commitment from all the member states on regional effort to minimize the loss and 
relieve the victims as soon as possible. Even though the implementation is slow in South 
Asia, members have not rejected any serious attempts and proposal to address issues like 
poverty alleviation, food security, or disaster management. Basic policy guidelines for 
SAARC to adopt initiatives on disaster management are from the Hyogo Framework for 
action 2005–2015 and the priorities laid out according to it. The priorities are also in 
SAARC comprehensive framework on Disaster Management, 2005. To achieve these 
priorities, the SDMC was formed to coordinate existing set ups and to address the further 
development of capabilities. However, the desired expansion and capacity building has 
not occurred due to lack of consensus and furtherance of agreements and policies.  
The SDMC was established with the mission to provide policy advice and to 
facilitate member states to build disaster response capability through “strategic learning, 
research, training, system development, expertise promotion and exchange of information 
for effective disaster risk reduction for planning and coordinating a rapid response 
mechanism” to deal with the disasters in the region.121To these ends, the SDMC 
formulated programs and policies through its comprehensive framework with priorities to 
develop and implement risk reduction strategy; establish regional and national response 
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mechanisms and a regional information sharing network; develop disaster management 
trainings, education, research; and develop awareness programs that apply information 
and communications technology (ICT) and effective monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms.122 
The SDMC also developed the SARRND agreement in 2011. This agreement 
focuses on rapid response to reduce loss of life and property in the region with the joint 
effort from national and regional cooperation in accordance with laid principles of 
employment.123 It represents standby agreement of disaster relief and emergency 
response, use and mobilization of resources and coordination of disaster relief and 
emergency response operations. Thus, SAARC is bound by major global agreements and 
policies on disaster management, as well as the SAARC Comprehensive Framework on 
Disaster Management, SARRND and occasional agreements in SAARC forum. SAARC, 
however, has to formulate policies creating roadmaps for the implementation of these 
agreements.  
2. Organizational Structures 
Policies, agreements and guidance are executed through organizations. 
Organizational structure in regional disaster management is required to establish a focal 
point to coordinate all activities, to link policy and operation, to link with global, regional 
and national structures operating in this field, to coordinate various operations to be 
conducted, to develop political consensus on various issues on disaster, to coordinate 
various NGOs working on disaster, and so on.124 The agreements of AADMER for 
ASEAN and the SAARC Comprehensive Agreement on Disaster Management 
necessitated the organizational structures in ASEAN and SAARC to achieve objectives 
and goals set through these agreements. 
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ASEAN has developed a thorough organizational web for many regional 
functions. Its chairman, normally assigned after the periodic summit, is responsible for 
running ASEAN through the institutions of the APSC, AEC, and ACSC. ASEAN disaster 
management and humanitarian assistance fall under the ASCC on the organizational 
chart.125 The ASEAN charter, focusing on “enhancing regional resilience by promoting 
greater political, security, economic and socio cultural” co-operation, serves the 
formation and operationalization of regional disaster management mechanism within the 
region.126 Such forums as the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defense Ministers 
Meeting (ADMM), ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) and ASEAN 
Chief of Defense Forces Informal Meetings (ACDFIM) are active in suggesting, guiding, 
and controlling ASEAN on prominent issues related to disasters. In case of natural 
disaster or pandemic, the ASEAN secretariat is responsible for coordinating all the 
branches of ASEAN to facilitate rescue, relief and further operations.127 
The AADMER is the foundation of all efforts being implemented within ASEAN. 
This agreement further necessitated the AHA center, which is the coordinating body of 
ASEAN for all the NDMOs of member states. It provides the key agreement and central 
guidelines for the actors to operate within the region and abroad as well as for the 
agencies within and abroad to work on disaster management. AHA Center has even been 
able to form a consortium, including a group of 34 NGOs, to work as a team as the 
ASEAN Disaster Reduction and Response Network.128 
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The AHA center further coordinates and conducts various activities to enhance 
the region’s disaster management capabilities in organizational development, resource 
development, skill development, coordination, supervision and empowerment. It also 
conducts exercises and seminars to educate and share lessons with various NDMO 
representatives as well as with global and other regional actors on disaster-related issues. 
It has even developed the ICT system to coordinate and share information and data with 
NDMOs and other actors.129 It has also developed its structure with automated tool 
resources and logistics to address the disaster at the earliest time possible. 
The AHA center is capable to operate with limited logistics, Emergency Response 
and Assessment Team (ERAT) and prearranged standby forces. An ERAT quick 
assessment team is first mobilized in liaison and coordination with the NDMOs of an 
affected country. The assessment team is to assess the situation on the ground and, if it 
finds that need persists, they are the first to request the further deployment of military and 
civilian assets from member states as per the ASEAN standby agreement; this 
deployment of assets is ultimately conducted by the AHA center in coordination with the 
host country.130 ERAT establishes the Joint Operations and Coordination Center of 
ASEAN (JOCCA) to converge and coordinate the resources from member states and 
works with the UN’s Onsite Operations and Coordination Center (OSOCC) to deal with 
assets approaching through the UN.131 
b. SAARC 
Compared to the AHA center, SAARC has not developed a wide structure to 
cover many aspects of disaster response. The SAARC Secretary General is authorized to 
control and co-ordinate the activities of the SDMC; however, the SAARC secretariat is 
located in Kathmandu, while the SDMC is stationed 800 miles away in New Delhi. The 
head of the SDMC is simultaneously the head of India’s National Institute of Disaster 
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Management (NIDM), located in the same compound. This arrangement makes the 
SDMC more reliant on the Indian disaster management body—and Indian domestic 
considerations. India remains primarily focused on developing its own national capacity 
rather than on regional development. Thus, the dual-hatted SDMC chief, with all staff 
from NIDM, is more likely to pursue Indian interests and block involvement of the 
United States and China in the regional programs.132 The placement of SDMC inside the 
perimeter of NIDM to utilize the existing Indian capability, done in order to save 
operating costs,133 was the wrong decision for a capable regional disaster management 
center. 
The relevance of any regional organization hinges on whether it can play a 
decisive role in a time of crisis, either in the region or in any of the member countries 
facing an issue that exceeds national capacities. Rescue and relief after the 2015 
earthquake in Nepal was the appropriate time for SDMC to exhibit its relevance by 
coordinating all member states and generating resources to furnish the relief effort. India 
and Pakistan have never welcomed one another’s assistance at any level of disaster in 
their country; however they looked wholeheartedly supportive in disaster rescue efforts in 
Nepal in 2015. The SDMC had the opportunity to exhibit a pivotal role in the case of a 
neutral third country like Nepal by facilitating and coordinating all or at least the regional 
actors involved, thereby proving its relevance.  
At the same time, the SDMC is fixated on the growth and success of ASEAN and 
has attempted to imitate ASEAN in important regards, including the disaster management 
and response framework. As ASEAN moved forward with its agreement on a Rapid 
Response mechanism, the SDMC has also developed its own. The SAARC 
Comprehensive Framework for Disaster Management was short and did not cover many 
aspects of regional cooperation except the formation of the SDMC. The 2011 SAARC 
Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disaster (SARRND) covered larger areas of 
regional cooperation. However, the SDMC has not been able to coax its members to 
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fulfill the requirements imposed on NDMOs for further progress on implementation. 
AADMER is more detailed than the SARRND in areas like its standby agreement, the 
use of military assets, and the role of AHA center. SAARC measures are hung up, 
pending the ratification of the agreement,134 because of the capacity gap in Afghanistan 
and the inability of the SDMC enforcing NDMO adoption of the preconditions.135 
The SDMC consolidated its resources by integrating all the warning centers 
related to disasters and environmental hazards under one umbrella which is not an issue 
in the case of AHA Center. SAARC ministerial meeting in Kathmandu in November 
2014 decided to merge the SAARC Forestry Centre in Bhutan, the SAARC Disaster 
Management Centre in New Delhi, the SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre in 
Maldives, and the SAARC Meteorological Centre in Dhaka into the SAARC 
Environmental and Disaster Management Centre (SEDMC).136 However, SAARC 
leaders have not identified where the SEDMC will be located, nor have they formulated 
the coordination mechanisms of all centers. The SEDMC is not operational now; while 
the SDMC is in a transition phase and not operational effective January 1, 2016.137 
SAARC is presently in the position of not having any functional regional disaster 
management center. 
The SEDMC organizational structure vertically links up to the SAARC secretariat 
and it works in coordination with the national disaster management organizations of 
member states. South Asian Disaster Knowledge Network (SADKN) under the SEDMC 
has prepared various plans as “Roadmaps” and has been trying to implement those plans 
and programs through agreements being prepared signed and ratified by the member 
states. A major milestone for SEDMC is the ratification of SARRND, signed in 2011. 
The existing structure leaves SEDMC as information collecting, collating and distributing 
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center only. The SADKN’s efforts are useful for future policy formulation, guidelines for 
NDMOs and operation in most part of the region. 
SAARC has yet to develop organizations like disaster management training 
institutes and disaster management logistic systems as developed in ASEAN. SAARC 
has identified the requirement of a Regional Emergency Operation Centre (REOC) under 
the requirement of SARRND. Delegates from SAARC were also sent to visit the AHA 
center to understand the mechanisms of such a center to be established in the future.138 
The SEDMC lacks fundamental organizational structure as compared with AHA center. 
Structures in ASEAN were established according to the flow chart of AADMER and 
follow up agreements, whereas, SAARC has yet to conclude how they are going to 
develop, coordinate, mobilize and operate these resources, either generated from military 
or civilian resources at the time of crisis.  
3. Coordination and Cooperation 
Coordination and cooperation is the key to success in achieving desired goals. 
Disaster management involves activities from multiple sectors. One stake is 
supplementary to another and no single organization can bear the risk of facing all 
probable eventualities and losses caused by disaster. Coordination and cooperation is 
primarily needed among various global and regional actors, national governments, 
NDMOs and regional military organizations to formulate and implement policies, plans 
and operations. In addition to this, coordination and cooperation with global, other 
regional partners and NGOs is also necessary to develop capabilities and expertise to 
prepare a regional set up to operate in the environment with multiple actors.   
a. ASEAN 
The coordination and cooperation in ASEAN is comparatively better than 
SAARC, with increased capability and an encouraging political environment. It has more 
extensive coordination with regional and global actors in disaster management. The type 
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and frequency of higher-level ASEAN ministerial meetings are greater in ASEAN than in 
SAARC, which enables quick decisions. Key groups and meeting in ASEAN for 
coordination and cooperation are ACDM, ARF, East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN’s 
Defence Minister’s Meetings (ADMM), ASEAN’s Defence Minister’s Meetings Plus 
(ADMM-Plus) and ASEAN’s Chief of Defence force’s informal meetings (ACDFIM).139 
ASEAN has strengthened its regional capability with trained personnel, logistic 
preparation, developing multilateral partners and fund generation. ASEAN coordination 
is now more focused on full implementation of a framework, guidelines and work 
programs for acquisition, control, and mobilization of their ERAT and standby force. The 
AHA center is also conducting exercises with USPACOM and interactions with EU, 
Chinese, Canadian, Australian, Japanese and South Korean disaster management 
authorities on professional, technical and logistic areas. 
b. SAARC 
Coordination and cooperation is measured through the smooth functioning of 
technical cooperation, various protocols to deploy military and civil defense assets, joint 
exercises, technical trainings, research coordination and so on.140 Coordination and 
cooperation in SAARC disaster management efforts are maintained through limited 
organizational arrangements. The SEDMC coordinates with the NDMOs of member 
states to update any details regarding disaster and vice-versa. The SEDMC also 
coordinates with NDMOs in the process of formulating any policy and agreements at 
regional level and provides assistance to NDMOs while preparing their national 
legislations concerning disaster management according to global/regional policies, 
agreements and road maps. The SEDMC pushes member states to pursue the goals 
targeted to build their national capabilities in research and information. It has also 
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periodically trained personnel from member states to develop structure in their countries, 
known as Training of Trainers. 
The Kathmandu SAARC Summit 2014 reiterated the need to have a Council of 
Ministers (Foreign Minister Level) meeting at least once a year, Standing Committee 
(Foreign Secretary level) meeting once a year, and Programming Committee (Joint 
Secretary level) meeting twice a year.141 However, the frequencies of meetings are very 
high in the case of ASEAN with various forums like APSC, AEC and ASCC creating 
more opportunities to facilitate and normalize the issues in various fields of cooperation. 
SAARC’s weak coordination and cooperation has caused slow progress. It developed the 
framework in 2005, the SDMC in 2006 and stagnated until 2011 before introducing the 
SARRND, which is yet to be operational.  
Major players in the region were not serious about developing the regional 
capability; rather they focused on their own national capabilities. In this period, India has 
tremendously built up its national capability—now to include its National Disaster 
Response force of 11 paramilitary battalions; Pakistan focused on developing its National 
Disaster Response Authority with an increased role for the Pakistan Armed Forces. 
Strengthened military disaster response capability of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh were also 
projected in the rescue relief operations in Nepal. In the meantime, no exercises among 
the national setups have prepared them for joint operations. 
4. Financing Disaster Management 
The amount of money spent to harden infrastructure before disaster is very much 
less than the amount spent after disaster.142 Due to the lack of funding in the developing 
world, reconstruction authorities are forced to rebuild with the negotiated budget, posing 
a threat to the whole area in the event of the next disaster, which keeps them in a vicious 
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circle of disasters.143 Therefore, the donors are now pushing more to adopt disaster risk 
management approaches in the development process together with good governance, 
accountability and the empowerment of the local community.144 
The UN Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction has recommended its 
members to fund for disaster risk reduction by allocating 10 percent of their humanitarian 
aid, 1 percent of development assistance, and 30 percent of their climate change adoption 
assistance.145 Additionally, many international financial institutions like the World  
Bank and regional development banks have aid and loan programs on disaster related  
issues.146 These organizations are also trying to reach out to cover those areas, regions, 
and countries. The developing world, along with their capacity building, should be able to 
develop their institutions and the mechanisms connecting with them and grab these 
opportunities.  
a. ASEAN 
There is a dedicated ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Relief Fund, 
which could be utilized by the ASEAN Secretariat under the guidance of a conference of 
the parties of ASEAN. This fund is created from voluntary contributions from the 
member states and contributions from other countries.147 The AHA center normally has a 
budget of US$5.8 million annually; member states contribute US$30,000 for running the 
office and the rest is generated through grants from the United States, UK, EU, Australia, 
Japan, New Zealand and others.148 
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Additionally, ASEAN has signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with 
many countries about various cooperative agreements. According to the MoU with 
China, ASEAN has received US$8.1 million to develop their capacity on disaster 
management.149 According to AADMER, ASEAN also has ASEAN Strategy on Disaster 
Risk Financing and Insurance and ASEAN Disaster Risk Insurance Program as flagship 
programs to enhance resilience, targeted for implementation by 2020.150 
b. SAARC 
A paucity of finances and resources are the retarding factors in the progress of 
SAARC disaster management programs. SAARC is not effective in pursuing the donors 
to receive significant assistance. SAARC does not have dedicated disaster relief fund in 
place. After the massive earthquake in Nepal in 2015, the UN estimated the requirement 
of US$423 million for the sustenance of survivors for three months.151 
The major reason for ineffectiveness of the disaster response operation aftermath 
the Nepal earthquake was the lack of funds to purchase necessary items, which forced the 
operation to rely more on improvisation. Nepal later conducted an international donors’ 
conference on June 25, 2015, to generate money for relief and reconstruction.152 If there 
were a dedicated disaster relief fund within SAARC, disaster situations would become 
easier to handle. In spite of limited funds, the SDMC conducted some research projects 
and seminars with assistance from UNISDR, ADRC, World Bank and others with 
approval from SAARC governing body.153 
There is some encouraging progress on the part of member states that they are 
now investing more in their NDMOs. The regional giant, India, has allocated US$9.1 
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billion (INR 612 billion) disaster relief fund for its states for the period of 2015–2020.154 
Other members have not been able to increase the disaster management budget very 
significantly; however they are seriously engaging with multiple countries and donors to 
develop their national capacities in disaster management. Indian investment has created 
better capability on this issue, which might be useful to other countries if there is regional 
harmony without any political impingement.   
ASEAN is more hardened in terms of finance and budget. It has system of 
managing its institutions by internal funding and conducting bigger projects with the 
funding and support from outside ASEAN. SAARC is still struggling to form its 
organizational structure and legislations. ASEAN’s way of generating funds could be a 
guide for SAARC in the future. The Indian position in SAARC could also be useful as it 
has capability to contribute more to the regional cause; such opportunity is lacking in 
case of ASEAN. India has offered the SEDMC and other structures in SAARC to make 
use of its civilian remote sensing capability get the real time assessment of zones of 
interest, especially in reference to disaster related issues.155 For such facilities, ASEAN 
is seeking support from outside the region. There are committed funds dedicated for 
disaster related issues in international and regional institutions. Better agreements, plans 
and programs of regional organization could help to attract those assistances in the 
region. Obviously, there is a scarcity of funds for SEDMC and its programs; however, the 
problems mostly lie in the political side of the organization. Political insubordination has 
made SAARC weaker in generating funds itself and drawing attention from donors.  
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5. Logistic Preparedness 
Poor logistic supply may increase the number of casualties and worsen the 
situation in disaster affected areas. Hence, logistic preparedness is also an important part 
of disaster risk reduction. The worst logistic preparation and supply may create an even 
worse law and order situation. This will further endanger the safety of relief workers, 
which may create more difficult conditions within which the civilian disaster relief 
agency must operate. Therefore, there should be firm parallel logistic stock, storage 
system and supply chain maintained together with other disaster relief operations.   
a. ASEAN 
ASEAN established the Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN 
(DELSA) at the Royal Malaysia Air Force Base in Subang, Malaysia on Dec 07, 2012, 
with assistance from the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) to manage the  
logistics warehouse co-managed by AHA center and the United Nations World Food 
Programme (UN-WFP) through the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot 
(UNHRD).156 AHA center practiced the limited mobilization of DELSA in the 
Philippines on November 2013 along with ERAT, but Typhoon Haiyan was too big to 
handle with the capability of ASEAN only.157 
b. SAARC 
SAARC has not prepared any logistic plans and logistic supply set up within its 
disaster management structure. Some roadmaps briefly talk about logistic chains in those 
kinds of disasters. Major logistic problems experienced in earthquake relief operation in 
Nepal 2015 were:158 
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 Congestion of international airport with the influx of various planes with 
supplies and relief teams. 
 Weak capability to handle influx of cargo. 
 Requirement of more helicopters due to disruption in land communication. 
 Limitations on the use of airport due to continuous aftershocks. 
 Lack of stores and open spaces for shelter, debris and waste. 
 Lack of coherence and integrated approaches in the atmosphere of influx 
of supporting nations, NGOs and groups willing to participate in the 
operation.  
These logistical limitations had caused large set backs on operations. Most of the 
limitations were related to capabilities lacked by the Nepalese NDMO; however if there 
was some regional logistic mechanism, that could help to fill the gap of Nepalese 
limitations. ASEAN has developed a limited capability for acquisition, storage, and 
distribution of disaster relief assets generated within, and from foreign partners and 
NGOs; in contrast, the SEDMC has to develop the system from the beginning. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Disaster management tasks are related to social, economic, political, and 
humanitarian factors among various actors with unequal capabilities. Additionally, the 
disaster-affected areas may have different capabilities and accessibility to cope with 
damages. Therefore, the controlling authority of the operation should have accurate 
assessment of damage and judicious allotment of resources. Disaster response capabilities 
cannot be developed overnight. Various agreements and declarations are not enough to 
concentrate all the available resources in the theater of operations. Better planning, 
procedures, regular interactions, practices and exercises help to identify critical 
capabilities and mutual support areas for better cooperation.  
The concept of disaster management gained prominence almost at the same time 
in ASEAN and SAARC. ASEAN formed the committee to discuss on the matter of 
disaster management in 2003, passed AADMER in 2005 and established AHA center in 
2011. SAARC was faster in the formation of a disaster management center earlier in 
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2006, according to SAARC Comprehensive Framework on Disaster Management of 
2005. However, AADMER was more descriptive than the SAARC Framework. 
Therefore, there was a need for the SARRND, which was passed only in 2011. The 
SARRND requires ratification and other infrastructure and progress from SAARC has 
stagnated. It was decided to form SEDMC from SDMC in November 2014, but nothing 
happened in the whole year of 2015, and four regional centers have been nonoperational 
as of  January 2016. But the members have not shown any urgency to make SEDMC 
operational. The fundamental structures to establish in the SEDMC are REOC, the 
SAARC Disaster Management Rapid Action Force (SDMRAF), a training center, an 
early mobilization team like ERAT in ASEAN, if SAARC follows the model of ASEAN. 
Most of the progress made in ASEAN was after 2011 after the establishment of AHA 
center. These targets are achievable for SAARC from regional resources and global 
assistance. The issue of regional approaches to disaster management is not taken 
seriously in SAARC. There have been some recent lessons for countries like Nepal, 
Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives whose national capacities are not sufficient 
to cope with larger disasters. New member Afghanistan is burdened with internal 
problems and unable to focus on this aspect.     
The decision-making process in ASEAN is unaffected by any hegemon within the 
region. Their decisions are consensus based and are normally unanimously accepted. 
However, there is strong U.S. influence on political issues and Chinese hegemonic 
influence on economic issues.159 These two hegemons are successfully achieving their 
interests in the region primarily through bilateral agreements and otherwise through 
multilateral agreements. The practice of consensus-based decision making, absence of 
supranational structure and non-interference in internal affairs are the unique 
characteristics of ASEAN. The same kinds of characteristics are also reflected in 
SAARC. However, the hegemonic nature of India and non-compliance with proposals 
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related to Indian interests has either stopped further progress in the decision making or 
slowed the implementation of agreed upon decisions. The geostrategic locations of 
Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh bring them politically, sociologically, culturally and 
economically closer to India. The hegemonic model of regionalism may flourish in that 
sub-region provided the others should feel their larger interests are taken care of by India, 
while they may sacrifice on smaller issues.  
There is a need for strong regional center to enforce capacity building of NDMOs, 
their local capacity development and implementation of disaster risk reduction plans on 
their development activities. Therefore, SAARC has a long list of tasks to complete for a 
capable disaster management center with strong policies, NDMOs and integrated local 
bodies to develop resilience for upcoming disasters. 
  
 57
IV. THE USE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT IN SAARC AND ASEAN: 
EFFECTS ON CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION 
Civil-military cooperation is defined by NATO as the “co-ordination and co-
operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, 
including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and 
non-governmental organizations and agencies.”160 To develop better civil-military 
cooperation, U.S. forces focus on Civil-Military Operations, which are considered 
“activities that establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces 
and civilian agencies in order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve 
operational U.S. objectives … which may be with local, regional national government, or 
may occur in the absence of other military operations.”161 
The United Nations uses “Civil-Military Coordination” to mean  
The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors 
in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote 
humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and 
when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from co-
existence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated 
by liaison and common training.162 
There are numerous actors operating on various disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, 
reconstruction, and peace building missions on the ground including the government 
civilian agencies of the host government, NGOs, national military and foreign militaries. 
These groups have different cultures, values, principles, organizations, and structures, 
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which obviously make it difficult to make them work together.163 Military cooperation 
with the civilian authority means assistance and subordination to the civilian effort, 
applying traditional military capabilities while addressing humanitarian needs. 
South Asia has experienced major disasters in the last decades. These disasters 
have most of the time exceeded government’s civilian capabilities and required assistance 
from militaries. National, regional and foreign military assets along with international 
humanitarian agencies were deployed in responding to some mega-disasters like the 
Pakistan floods in 2005 and 2010, the Pakistan earthquake in 2005, the Indian Ocean 
earthquake and tsunami in 2004, and the Nepal earthquake in 2015. Experiences on those 
disaster relief operations have highlighted many aspects of civil-military cooperation. 
This chapter discusses the civil-military problems in disaster management with a global 
overview, the role of the military in ASEAN and SAARC and challenges to effective 
civil-military cooperation in SAARC to identify the progress to achieve for better civil-
military cooperation while responding future disasters.  
A. THE CIVIL-MILITARY PROBLEM IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
Various international organizations and the government have developed their 
doctrines and guidelines to facilitate the civil-military cooperation. Militaries possess the 
capabilities to provide security, lift and supply of logistics, disciplined teams and the 
ability to perform the task; the civilian agencies have the capability to work together with 
the locals directly, more knowledge of the ground, technical expertise and long term 
commitment to the problem through their institutions.164 These mismatched capabilities 
are particularly troublesome in humanitarian and disaster relief operations.  
At the national level, the military and its assets have been used in national 
disasters for a long time; however, the role of armed forces in international disaster 
management started later. Superpowers during the Cold War were focusing on 
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developing their conventional military capabilities. Interests and the focus of states 
shifted from territorial security to human security after the Cold War. Capability in 
disaster relief operation became a tool to influence countries in trouble through accepted 
military employment which encouraged capable states to develop their military assets to 
be employed in disaster relief operations.  
The United Nations Oslo Guidelines of 1992 paved the institutional way to use 
civilian assets of the governments, NGO assets and military assets as required in disaster 
relief and humanitarian operations. Worsening security situations in such disaster-
affected areas as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Africa forced the evolution of wider 
Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) Guidelines in 2006, with priority given to the 
security of the area and agencies involved in the disaster operations.165 Nations who had 
deployed unprecedented military assets in response to natural disasters in 2004–2005 in 
insurgency affected countries like Pakistan, Indonesia and Sri Lanka required expanded 
and accepted guidelines for the legitimacy of their military and civil defense assets 
contribution.166 MCDA guidelines in 2006 expanded mobilization and deployment of 
foreign military assets under “bilateral or under regional or alliance agreements as other 
deployed forces or as part of a United Nations operation as UN MCDA” facilitating the 
affected state’s call for international assistance to deal with the disaster beyond their 
national capability.167 The affected state bears all the responsibility to coordinate, control 
and facilitate all relief actions of MCDA, to operate with bilateral cooperation, regional 
cooperation or from international relief programs.168 The MCDA Guidelines 2006  
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provide more authority to the affected government to utilize its own, regional and 
international MCDA along with national and international humanitarian agencies; 
however, it is also the responsibility of the state to facilitate the environment for better 
coordination among all the actors employed in disaster relief operations. 
The operating procedures, command, and information flow of security 
organizations differ with various other civilian organizations in the field. The overall 
effort may be at times uncoordinated, under-resourced, or sometimes unnecessarily over-
resourced. Either way, operations are complicated and often less than efficient, with 
recriminations on all sides. Even though an array of NGOs and the U.S. Humanitarian 
Assistance Team was deployed in the Rwanda crisis in 1994, the operation was not very 
effective overall, due to a lack of coordination among the parties in the field.169 As such, 
all the organizations involved missed out on chances to improve their own operations, 
whether by information provided to the U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Team from the 
NGOs already deployed there, or creation by the U.S. forces of an environment in which 
the NGOs could operate.     
Similarly, in the Indian Tsunami of 2004, the Pakistan Earthquake of 2005, or the 
Sichuan Earthquake of 2008, massive numbers of external and internal actors—civilian 
and military—intervened in the disaster relief operation; however, the major challenge 
during those operations was to coordinate and synergize capabilities involved on the 
ground.170 Research from Promoting Better Emergency Risk Communication states that 
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events, but they may even be enhanced.”171 The basic code of conduct and practices of 
the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, and NGOs governed the operations of civilian actors; at 
the same time, the military actors followed different operating procedures and tried to 
involve other civilians in their set of operations. Interoperability is the key issue; various 
groups should identify the operating procedure of their co-groups. Lack of such 
coordination has at times created differences among the parties involved on assessment of 
“identification of the relief need, sourcing of HA/DR supply with sustained sub-chain, 
method of estimating priorities in support of the ground requirement and tasking and 
operating scarce aviation and maritime based assets.”172 
The level of cooperation depends also on the level of the highest coordinating 
institutions involved in the field. If such experienced institutions as the UN or NATO or 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are in the lead, their 
expertise helps to shape the overall operation and bring about better environments for 
cooperation. To avoid confusion during disaster relief operations, they have preplanned 
guidelines, and have previously exercised with most of the partners to understand each 
other’s role, capabilities, and limitations.  
Strong organizations operating globally like the UN, ICRC, NATO, EU, and the 
U.S. Army have guidelines for disaster relief operations. The UN guiding principles are 
more of a civilian nature focusing on the use of civilian structures of humanitarian 
assistance. The UN guidelines emphasize that the request for military assets should be 
made even by the humanitarian actors operating in the field; so that, it can request only 
critical assets from its military counterpart.173 However, in many cases of mega-scale 
disasters, the situation drifts beyond the capability of the humanitarian agency of that 
state and the national army holds the control of the rescue/relief operation from the 
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beginning. Moreover, national armies are in a pivotal role in most developing countries. 
In those situations, inadequate guidelines and practices do not match with the situation on 
the ground, which often creates poor civil-military cooperation in the field. 
The OSCE focus more on agreed upon humanitarian principles (humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality and independence) and agreed upon guidelines with an enhanced 
central role of the UN while assisting on disaster relief operations in developing countries 
outside the EU.174 NATO Policy on Disaster Management 2008 follows the MCDA 
Guidelines or the Oslo Guidelines, as appropriate, while using its military assets in 
response to humanitarian situations with the humanitarian “principles of neutrality, 
humanity and impartiality”.175 Major actors in the international disaster relief operations 
such as the UN, the EU and the NATO all have taken the MCDA, the Oslo Guidelines 
and the universal principles of humanitarian assistance as their basis for their disaster 
relief guidelines. Finally, it is the capacity and policy of the stricken country to decide 
how it will call and accommodate international assistances while managing disaster.  
Military engagements in most humanitarian assistance operations arouse 
controversies after the completion of the mission. After all, such operations do not 
comport with the usual military engagements. This circumstance leads to a certain 
amount of civil-military consternation as well. Conventional theories of civil-military 
relations do not explain how the military deployed in the field should subordinate to the 
civilian actor—even though the notion of civilian supremacy demands the overall control 
of humanitarian operations by the national or international civilian authority. In most 
disaster relief operations, active civilian government agencies controlling the operations 
in various sectors are missing; still, the theater of operation comprises a large sphere of 
civilian bodies operating in the zone.176The uncertainties of disasters, the amount of 
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required resources, and the variety of security situations in disaster zones mean that 
armed forces personnel will remain part of the response. Therefore, better civil-military 
cooperation is needed for successful disaster management. 
B. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ASEAN AND SAARC 
After persistent pressure from the UN and donors, the developing world has 
started focusing on managing disasters. For all the good intentions in and of these states, 
however, the reality remains that developing nations operate with limited resources. 
Thus, they are bound to task their institutions in multiple roles—decisions often based on 
which organizations can fulfill the necessary task, rather than which ones should, at least 
theoretically, take the lead. Most developing countries find their military and civil 
defense mechanisms readily available—and interchangeable—for disaster relief 
operations. Leaders in the developing world also see how developed states routinely use 
their armies in foreign disaster relief, so there seems to be solid precedent for this role.   
1. ASEAN 
ASEAN has identified its military capabilities as crucial assets in an overall 
disaster management plan. It has adopted The Use of ASEAN Military Assets and 
Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, which outlines how the 
member states should be using their civilian and military assets in disaster 
management.177 The culture of frequent meetings among the defense ministers of the 
region together with the experts on various aspects and types of disasters further helped 
in formulating SOPs to ease military cooperation and coordination.178 On March 16, 
2015, the defense ministers’ meeting passed the proposal to create the ASEAN Militaries 
Ready Group to deploy as early as first responder with prescribed relief and humanitarian 
assistance at the request of the affected member state as authorized by the decision of 
                                                 






ASEAN governing body.179 It is an important milestone, which has taken the 
cooperation within ASEAN to another level. 
ASEAN has even conducted various exercises among militaries of the United 
States, China, Japan, India, Japan and Australia together and individually with actors 
from various humanitarian agencies to enhance capabilities in disaster relief operations. 
Additionally, ASEAN has developed trilateral civil-military HA/DR cooperation with the 
United States, Japan and Australia to develop the comprehensive capability in the region 
with the help of those resource-developed countries.180 Similarly, ASEAN has the same 
kind of cooperation with China to establish military to military cooperation. Thus, 
ASEAN has opened all the avenues of support within, nearby and outside the region with 
a developed procedure to request and employ foreign civilian and military assets in a time 
of crisis and disasters. 
To highlight more about the role and employment of the military in a national and 
regional disaster relief role, Indonesia, an influential member of ASEAN, is a good 
example as it is the most disaster-prone country181 with the largest military in the region. 
Indonesia has deployed its national army in most cases of national disasters. The 
Republic of Indonesia law in 2004 and 2007 identifies its national army as a directing 
element in national disaster response management and specifies that it assists “in 
responding to the impact of natural disasters, IDPs management and humanitarian 
assistance distribution.”182 The role of the military on this issue is so vital that any 
country willing to assist Indonesia in disaster relief operations should request to do so 
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through the channel of MoD, National Army or Indonesian Police describing with the 
specific assistance being provided.183 These legal parameters have placed the military as 
the pivot of national efforts on disaster management. 
2. The SAARC Region 
In comparison with other regional organizations, SEDMC is very weak in policy 
formulation, consultation, coordination and implementation of procedures for regional 
efforts in disaster relief operations. The latest policy formulation of SEDMC is the 
SAARC Agreement on the Rapid Response of Natural Disasters signed in November 
2011; however its ratification is pending, so it is not yet operational. Moreover, the 
agreement required further deliberations with supplementary agreements like Regional 
Standby Agreements for Civilian and Military Assets and Coordination of Joint Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Response Operations.184 However, the member states are 
developing their own capabilities of civilian and military assets in coordination with 
regional and global partners deployed in respective countries. Most of the South Asian 
countries have identified their militaries as on important component of their disaster 
response mechanism and tasked them to be prepared in case of natural disasters. 
Practices within India and Pakistan are typical examples in the SAARC region for 
the utilization of national resources to deal with disasters. Both the countries have 
nominal civilian structures and major responsibilities are assigned to their armed forces 
and their defense services. Indian armed forces are often called to assist civilian 
authorities.185 The armed forces of India are supposed to be called up last to complement 
human resource and equipment gaps of civil administration and to leave first; but, in most 
of the cases, they have to enter first and leave last because of ill equipped civilian disaster 
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relief capability.186 This circumstance has forced the Indian armed forces to prepare for 
unprecedented tasks and has legitimized them to solicit more resources from the 
government for better preparedness.  
Pakistan has national disaster management structures with national, provincial and 
district disaster management authorities. National Disaster Management Authority 
(NDMA) has envisaged the role of the army in relief, recovery, management of displaced 
personnel, and to provide security whenever necessary.187 The Pakistan Army also has 
parallel disaster management organizations within the military with army, corps and 
divisions allocated to operate parallel with civilian national, provincial and district 
disaster management authorities.188 Because of poor civilian disaster management 
structures, the Pakistan military and its assets were extensively employed in recent mega-
disasters after the 2005 and 2010 floods and the 2005 earthquake.189 
C. CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN 
SAARC 
The task of the military to support civilian authority means there is a need to have 
good civil-military cooperation, both at the national level and the international level, to 
complete the allotted task. The norms of civil-military relations are easy to observe and 
may function properly if the deployment of agencies follows the sequence of initial 
employment of civilian agencies and later militaries to supplement them; however, 
problems arise because the national and foreign militaries are extensively deployed from 
the beginning.190 
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The latest case for disaster management in SAARC region was the relief 
operation in the Nepal earthquake in April 2015. Out of the 18 countries that participated 
with their military assets in Nepalese earthquake disaster relief, India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan were from South Asia.191 The Nepal Army planned, 
coordinated and conducted the operation through the Multinational Military Operations 
and Coordination Center (MNMCC) in coordination with the UNDAC Team’s On-Site 
Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC).192 The OSOCC further established The 
Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Center (HuMOCC) co-located with 
MNMCC to promote the interface among humanitarian agencies, national and foreign 
militaries.193 Many complained about the weak civil-military coordination in the initial 
stage of the operation due to the absence of well-planned procedures within the Nepal 
Army and the region.194 This criticism has highlighted the requirement of better national 
capacity to accommodate all forms of foreign assistance and practices beforehand. 
1. Lack of Mutual Understanding 
Mutual understanding to supplement one another’s capability gap is very 
important to achieve good civil-military cooperation. The international humanitarian 
community did not cooperate with the Pakistani national military during the Pakistan 
flood response in 2010 as the Pakistan Army was controlling the overall operation and 
the humanitarian community felt it was losing sight of the central role in the operation.195 
Similar kinds of misunderstandings were also experienced in the Pakistan earthquake 
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response in 2005.196 These kinds of misunderstandings could be minimized by an 
organized coordinating system in which all parties know beforehand how to coordinate 
with one another to get the job done. 
The UNOCHA in Nepal had formed an Inter-Agency Standing Committee to 
increase the interagency cooperation among UNOCHA Nepal and other major NGOs 
working on disaster management, to standardize the working procedures, division of 
tasks and resources among the parties involved and to establish liaison with the military 
and the civil defense partners to work together with them in various clusters.197 This 
committee was very supportive in the Koshi Flood Relief Operation in 2008 in Nepal in 
dividing the task and resources of various agencies to supplement the government effort 
to rescue and relieve the flood victims.198 
2. Bureaucratic Hurdles 
Bureaucratic hurdles badly affect the effectiveness of disaster relief operations, 
especially in security clearance and customs clearance of personnel, relief items,  
and equipment. During the time of crisis, there is a high flow of goods and personnel 
through customs. The UN office had urged the Nepalese government to ease the customs 
clearing problem through the airport as the goods were stranded and the people were 
desperately in need during the disaster relief operation in Nepal after the 2015 
earthquake.199  This was the early point in the debate between the international 
community and the government to pursue their way of conducting customs, causing a 
problem in cooperation. 
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There are cases of inter-agency rivalry within the state or among the NGOs and 
international organizations seeking roles and resources. Different organizations possess 
wide ranges of expertise and experiences but resources are always scarce in a crisis 
environment. Resupplies are made available through quick supply chains developed by 
the central coordinating authority in the field. If these resources are not distributed 
properly with the capable authority to handle, there are chances of misuse or underuse of 
that capability, role and resources. Facing a paucity of important resources, other civilian 
and international agencies also blamed the Nepalese government and Nepal Army for not 
providing them access, resources and priority in using air assets for them.200 There was 
also rivalry among government agencies in Nepal about who should control the available 
resources on ground.201 
Additionally, there are different set of working procedures between military and 
civilian bureaucrats. Their differences in preparing and presenting papers also at times 
delay the supply of goods and services to the needy. Chinese trucks with relief personnel 
and goods were stopped for long time by the Pakistani traffic police on their way to flood 
relief operations in 2010 as their permission was not transmitted to lower-level personnel 
who were controlling the area.202 
These hurdles are more common with the shipments following the logistic chain, 
causing delay and weakening cooperation in overall operation. Everyone should 
genuinely perform their duties and the bureaucratic liaison has to be done in advance for 
proper “implementation of Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of 
international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance” (IDLR Guidelines) accepted 
by most countries in 2007.203 
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3. Lack of Trust 
The success of a disaster management operation requires a strong trust among the 
contributing parties with the network. Long term relations are the key to develop trust. 
Disaster management operations are normally conducted by partners with little or no 
previous common trainings, rules and common working experiences.204 The issue of 
trust is even more sensitive in the environment where militaries of different countries are 
operating together. Transparency and sharing of valuable information among the parties 
involved in the operation can help build trust among the parties in the operation. 
While preparing Digital Vulnerability Atlas (DVA) of South Asia by SADKN, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka did not provide some geographical information to 
SADKN because of a trust deficit on perceived sensitive security areas.205 South Asia 
was left with an incomplete DVA and SADKN had to work on the same project again 
after data were made available.  
There is weak trust among the parties in South Asia due to the India-Pakistan 
rivalry and unresolved issues on river management. Floods due to unguarded shared 
rivers such as the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna are always concerns for the 
people at lower riparian zones, and higher riparian states are blamed for unsolved issues 
of river control. India is criticized in the Pakistani/Bengali media for not cooperating to 
control rivers to limit floods in Pakistan206 and Bangladesh.207 Similarly Nepal is 
blamed in India for floods in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, India.208 These unresolved issues 
not only endanger the lives of the people, but also are contentious issues between states, 
creating the situation of distrust within the region.  
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4. Lack of Common Working Procedures 
Militaries and civilians have lots of differences in their working procedures. 
Civilians and NGOs are more versed with the latest equipment and technologies and their 
decision-making process is fast with better initiatives for the team on the ground, whereas 
the military follows the chain of command and their decision are more imposed. 
Militaries are more rigid about sharing of information. The Pakistani government 
authority expressed their frustration over civilian agencies operating in clusters in 
Pakistan flood relief in 2005 for not providing information to the militaries operating in 
that area.209 NGOs felt uncomfortable with the participation of military representatives in 
their cluster meeting.210 
Cristiana Matei on her work on Intelligence Reform in the United States after 
9/11 has highlighted language and cultural issues as a challenge to developing 
cooperation and coordination among the agencies working in multiple agency 
environments.211 This phenomenon is also common in the environment of disaster 
management with multiple actors. Various civilian agencies use different terminologies 
and even militaries of different countries use different terminologies while dealing with 
disaster management. Similarly, it is difficult to understand military jargons, acronyms 
and terminologies for civilian and vice versa. Various terminologies in practice are 
associated with the institution and these terminologies possess core values of that 
institution.212 Standardization of disaster related terminologies, policies, doctrines and 
operational concepts for all actors is a difficult solution.213 
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Differences in working cultures among agencies create misunderstandings and 
frustrations. Motives of the mission might also be different for military and NGOs. NGOs 
have their organizational motives, whereas, the military employment follows after 
political decisions.214 NGOs are more focused on mobilization of locals and their 
resources;  the military mission is supposed to perform the job with its allotted resources. 
These differences in their working procedures hinder homogeneity in the approach to the 
mission. 
During 2010 flood rescue operations in Pakistan, the Pakistani government did 
not have clear national guidelines for civil-military cooperation, while various 
international militaries and NGOs were participating.215 Domestic and foreign militaries 
were very useful as they better facilitated the operation with specialized equipment, 
robust manpower and wide presence in many parts of the country; however, their  
way of conduct clashed with the NGOs’ principles of impartiality, neutrality and 
independence.216 Therefore, there were incidents of rivalry between the national army 
and NGOs control of the operation, resources on the ground and facilitation for one 
another.217 The fundamental problem in operating procedures between civilians and 
military is difficult to change; however, they may better cooperate by creating a better 
environment for addressing frequent problems through experiences, joint approaches and 
following up of international norms of civil-military cooperation. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The militarization of disaster relief operations has increased a great deal, 
especially in foreign humanitarian assistance. The mobilization of military personnel and 
military assets are ultimately a political decision of states to achieve their national 
interests. Even though their goal is to reduce/eliminate suffering of disaster victims, their 
culture of handling the difficult situation is different than civilian actors in humanitarian 
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agencies. While operating in urgent situations like disasters, each party feels their basic 
practices, norms and values are challenged.  
The role of military in disaster management is less prominent after the rescue and 
relief stage. After some phase of the operation, the prime role in the field has to change 
from military to civilian actor. There are complaints in many cases from international 
organizations and NGOs about bad cooperation from the military and the host 
government. However, basic problems lie within those parties such as weak interagency 
cooperation, bureaucratic hurdles, lack of trust and lack of common working procedures 
creating conditions for confusion and misunderstanding.  
Additionally, there is a plethora of NGOs in the region working in disaster 
management and they hold certain capability and legitimacy to work as per global norms. 
So, their importance and role also has to be integrated in the state capacity keeping in 
view that their working culture is different than the military assets of the government. 
The host government and the regional center are responsible to strike a balance in the 
division of roles and development of a working environment for all of them. Therefore, 
there should be clear guidelines about the role and field of cooperation between these 
actors. The coordinating body of the whole operation should be well versed with the flow 
of the operation. Therefore, there is a need of greater interactions, exercises and drills 
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V. CONCLUSION 
“The UN has calculated that 97 percent of all deaths related to natural disasters 
occur in developing countries.”218 For example, in 2003, an earthquake with a magnitude 
of 6.6 killed 26,000 in Bam, Iran; four days later, a comparable quake killed just two in 
California.219  This difference in damage and casualties owes more to the collapse of 
man-made structures, often built with no consideration (or no budget) for seismic 
improvements, than to the disaster itself. 
South Asia is continuously suffering from disasters—natural and man-made. The 
damage caused by these disasters has long-term and ongoing effects on victims who are 
not receiving proper relief and rehabilitation after disasters due to weak capacity of the 
region to cope with these disasters. The effects of disasters are minimized in most parts of 
the world through disaster risk mitigation plans, disaster response programs within the 
overall development and security plans, and development of the capability to respond to 
various kinds of disasters. In contrast, SAARC countries have not been able individually 
to develop their capacity to respond to these disasters completely or effectively.  
Ideally, South Asia would focus on building regional disaster management 
capability. For one thing, most disasters are regional in nature, cause, and impact, and 
they require attention from two or more countries in the region. A coordinated regional 
disaster management capability also reduces redundancy and gaps in a resource-
challenged area. Countries are more connected with each other to achieve their shared 
interest through their regional “clubs” to interact with the globalized world.  
The progress of SAARC and regionalism in South Asia is more affected by India 
and its relations with its neighbors. India is even blamed for meddling in the internal 
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politics of neighboring countries like Sri Lanka,220 Bangladesh,221 and Nepal222 to shape 
their role in favor of India. On the other hand, the governing parties frequently change in 
the region which has further imbalanced the region with changing government behaviors 
toward India and other global actors outside the region—most noticeably China. 
The development of SAARC disaster response capability is also at very slow pace 
because of weak regionalism. The concerns for regional response to natural disasters 
appeared to be growing in the region after the Nepal Earthquake of 2015. The SAARC 
Comprehensive Framework for Disaster Management and SARRND laid the path for the 
development of voluntary standby force for regional response to disaster.223 However, 
there was a lot of suspicion about bringing all the armed forces together in one theater of 
operations. Even though there were many limitations on the capability of overall 
operation, the operation offered the platform for the two rival militaries (Indian and 
Pakistani), who had no problems when tasked by neutral authority. Additionally, India 
and Pakistan have agreed to establish common SAARC Disaster management force with 
specialization to respond to natural and man-made disaster.224 India also hosted the first 
South Asian Annual Disaster Management Exercise (SAADMEx-2015) including teams 
from all members of SAARC in India on November 2015. The exercise focused on 
resilience building against earthquake and chemical emergencies.225 It is a very first step, 
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which has started the cooperation among not only civilians, but also among militaries 
operating on disaster management.  
The traditional humanitarian actors, international organizations and NGOs now 
have to work together with faster and powerful military components in disaster affected 
areas. Due to security threats in affected areas and supplementing capabilities from 
military institutions, their roles in the disaster relief operations are also accepted. Most of 
the capable countries identify and keep a part of their armed forces on standby as rapid 
response teams for disaster relief operations to be deployed elsewhere. Interoperability is 
the key issue where various groups must identify the operating procedure of their co-
groups. This requires working procedures, close coordination and understanding each 
other’s capacities and limitations. The actors should focus primarily on “identification of 
the relief need, sourcing of HA/DR supply with sustained sub-chain, method of 
estimating priorities in support of the ground requirement and tasking and operating 
scarce aviation and maritime based assets.”226 Therefore, there is a need to develop 
common professional language, procedures, commonality in appreciating risk and 
urgency. This all can be achieved by strong commitments, interactions, joint-exercises 
and seminars among the participating bodies in disaster operations to avoid civil-military 
culture clash.  
The major problem in SAARC disaster management lies with the disaster 
management center itself. There should be a serious concern to operationalize SEDMC as 
soon as possible. Detailed guidelines have to be prepared and adopted on how the new 
SEDMC will operate or will continue as SDMC. The decision to locate SEDMC is very 
urgent. The budgeting, staffing and the role of SEDMC have to expand to control and 
guide NDMOs effectively. Immediate guidelines on establishment of rapid action force 
and REOC as per the SARRND has to be agreed upon.  
Member states also have to be sincere in their efforts to develop their respective 
NDMOs with guidelines, SOPs, organization, staff and budgets as required to operate 
parallel with SEDMC. NDMOs should be able to deploy their structure in different 
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sectors within the country to facilitate and coordinate operation in multinational 
environment. The NDMOs should have clear and detailed plan to include and task the 
international organizations and NGOs within the country. NDMOs should be able to 
identify the priorities and divide the resources received from the state and be able to 
generate resources through international organizations and NGOs for development of 
additional capability. It is the duty of the NDMOs to concentrate all other resources and 
guide NGOs to fill the capability gap of government. It is difficult to develop all these 
capabilities quickly with the limited resources, so there should be detailed planning, 
programming and budgeting in phases.  
The level of the SAARC secretariat should also be lifted from the secretary level 
to ministerial level, so that he/she is able to call and coordinate meetings of respective 
ministers on urgent issues. The frequencies of interactions at the ministerial level and 
secretary level should be increased to develop a better environment among leaders. The 
director of SEDMC should at least be at the level of secretary, so that he/she might feel 
comfortable interacting, guiding and cooperating with respective NDMO secretaries. 
Some dire disaster related issues concern sub-regions only. Even though some 
disasters like floods in Bangladesh, floods in Uttar Pradesh/Bihar in India and floods in 
Pakistan are reoccurring disasters, governments have not been able to develop coherent 
mechanisms to fight these reoccurring disasters. The information about increased amount 
and flow of water can be useful for disaster management institutions of lower riparian 
states. The region has not been able to manage rivers and harness their capabilities for 
energy and irrigation for greater benefit. Increased subregional cooperation may create 
possibilities to address those issues. Therefore, SAARC and SEDMC should facilitate 
those sub-regional issues and push concerning states to find solutions on underlying 
threats. This will help to increase the culture of cooperation within the region. 
The SEDMC should facilitate a platform to synchronize all efforts from 
international organization and NGOs working on disaster management through its 
emergency operation center. It should have a plan to task all the government civilian 
agencies, international organizations, NGOs, local organizations, regional militaries and 
foreign militaries in close coordination with respective NDMOs and national military. 
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The SEDMC and NDMOs should have clear guidelines for all actors to involve their 
roles, limitations and responsibilities so that they will be conversant with the support and 
cooperation from other agencies involved during the time of crisis. The SEDMC and 
NDMOs should organize joint exercises, seminars and interactions to develop better 
cooperation and coordination especially among military and major civilian actors on 
disaster management.  
Finally, the most important aspect to enhance regional disaster management 
capacity is the enhanced cooperation within member states and the strong sense of the 
importance of regionalism to address problems in the region. The animosity between the 
states concentrates their focus on militarization and conflicts. However, there are many 
soft areas related to environmental protection, disaster management, food, energy, trade, 
transit, agriculture, poverty alleviation and so on. Rival states should extensively start 
working on these soft issues. These interactions will develop an environment of dialogue 
to solve problems like enhancement of regional capacity on disaster management. 
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